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TOLERANCE AS UNDERSTANDING
JAY SCHIFFMAN*
INTRODUCTION
It is commonly argued that love has no place in theories of
tolerance, law or politics. The great twentieth century writer E.M.
Forster believed that tolerance could not be based on love. He wrote:
'Love is what is needed,' we chant, and then sit back
and the world goes on as before. The fact is, we can
only love what we know personally. And we cannot
know much. In public affairs,... something much less
dramatic and emotional is needed, namely tolerance.
Tolerance is a very dull virtue .... It merely means
putting up with people, being able to stand things. No
one has ever written an ode to tolerance, or raised a
statue to her. Yet this quality ... is the sound state of
mind which we are looking for ....
[Tolerance is] just a makeshift, suitable for an
overcrowded and overheated planet. It carries on when
love gives out, and love generally gives out as soon as
we move away from our home and our friends, and
stand among strangers in a queue for potatoes.'
Forster's quote represents the standard liberal account of
tolerance. 2  This account of tolerance is based on a number of
* Ph.D., New York University, 2002; M.A., New York University, 1994; J.D., cum
laude, New York University School of Law, 1993, B.A., University of Michigan, 1990. I
want to thank Professors Anna Harvey, John Ferejohn, Pasquale Pasquino, Russell Hardin and
Michael Gilligan for their insights.
1. E.M. FORSTER, Two CHEERS FOR DEMOCRACY 45,47 (1951).
2. The standard liberal account of tolerance is an outgrowth of the works of the great
liberal thinkers. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1992) [hereinafter HOBBES, LEVIATHAN];
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1993) [hereinafter MILL, ON LIBERTY]; JOHN LOCKE, THE
POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE 390-436 (David Wootton ed., 1993) [hereinafter, LOCKE,
LETTER ON TOLERATION]; JOHN LOCKE, THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN LOCKE 186-210
(David Wootton ed., 1993) [hereinafter LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING TOLERATION]; RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) [hereinafter DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS];
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empirical assumptions, namely that controversial differences in society
necessarily exist, that love cannot extend beyond close familial and
social ties, and that beyond these ties, love has little power to assure
that social differences do not lead to intolerance or repression.
3
Although it is undisputed that Forster's claims have historical validity,
this does not mean that the empirical assumptions underlying Forster's
views, specifically those regarding a person's capacity for empathy
and compassion for strangers, are entirely accurate.
This article questions the empirical foundations and normative
aspirations underlying liberal accounts of tolerance such as Forster's,
and proposes an alternative normative framework for conceptualizing
political tolerance. This alternative framework may be used to critique
and advance standard liberal conceptions of tolerance. This article
presents a theory called tolerance as understanding, which
conceptualizes tolerance as a moral obligation stemming from
paramount moral virtues such as empathy and compassion, rather than
as a means for achieving liberal goals such as autonomy.4 This article
asks whether liberalism, because of its emphasis on individuality and
autonomy, underrates the possibilities of empathy and compassion as
organizing principles for political tolerance.
Part I of this article explores the empirical and normative
foundations underlying the standard liberal account of tolerance. Part
II outlines tolerance as understanding. This theory of tolerance relies
loosely on the idea that people primarily want to be loved, understood
and cared for, more than they want a given substantive matter decided
in their favor. This theory is inspired by the idea that few people,
including committed political activists, would exchange the love of
their parents, children, significant others or friends for their favored
abortion, death penalty, or euthanasia position. Part III addresses
whether tolerance as understanding can be effectively applied in cases
involving tolerance and civil rights. In Part III, tolerance as
understanding is applied to four controversial subjects: the death
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986) [hereinafter, DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE]; IMMANUEL
KANT, POLITICAL WRITINGS (H.S. Reiss ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1991) (1970); JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE]; JOHN RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM]. The definition of
liberal tolerance will be developed throughout the discussion infra Part I.
3. Id. This argument is most frequently attributed to Thomas Hobbes. See HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN, supra note 2.
4. The term "tolerance as understanding" is first introduced in this article, but it not an
entirely new conception of tolerance. The political, legal and religious foundations of
tolerance as understanding will be developed in full infra Part II.
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penalty, gay rights, hate speech, and minority religious freedoms.
Throughout the discussion of tolerance as understanding, the critical
issue will be whether it can serve as an empirically and normatively
sound foundational principle for individual moral behavior, and
subsequently, whether it can be used for resolving constitutional cases
concerning tolerance and civil rights.
I. LIBERAL TOLERANCE
What does it mean to be a tolerant society? The scholarly
answer to this question has been surprisingly uniform. The dominant
account of tolerance in constitutional jurisprudence, as well as
American society more generally, is best characterized as the "Live
and Let Live" credo. 5  Americans generally believe that tolerance
requires them to put up with objectionable thoughts, speech, and acts
6
of their neighbors, as long as these neighbors are not threatening.
This standard account of tolerance is primarily liberal.7 It provides
that because individuals have a right to believe as they choose, out of
5. John Stuart Mill provides the clearest statement of the "Live and Let Live" credo.
See MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 2, at 12-13. Mill writes:
... the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against
his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or
moral, is not a sufficient warrant.
Id. Liberal justifications for political tolerance dominate constitutional jurisprudence.
See DAVID RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986) [hereinafter, RICHARDS,
TOLERATION]; Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT.
REV. 245 (1961); DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS, supra note 2; DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra
note 2; RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 2; RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note
2.
6. Similarly, the political science survey research literature generally frames tolerance
in liberal terms. HERBERT MCCLOSKY & ALIDA BRILL, DIMENSIONS OF TOLERANCE: WHAT
AMERICANS BELIEVE ABOUT CIVIL LIBERTIES (1983) (survey research suggesting that
Americans are tolerant -- based on standard liberal conceptions of tolerance -- in the abstract
but when presented with specific contexts far less tolerant). See also CLYDE Z. NUNN, ET AL.,
TOLERANCE FOR NONCONFORMITY (1978); James L. Gibson & Richard D. Bingham, On the
Conceptualization and Measurement of Political Tolerance, 76 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 603-20
(1982); James L. Gibson, The Political Consequences of Intolerance: Cultural Conformity and
Political Freedom, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 338-56 (1992); JOHN L. SULLIVAN, ET AL.,
POLITICAL TOLERANCE AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1982); GEORGE E. MARCUS, ET AL., WITH
MALICE TOWARD SOME (1995).
7. Liberalism is a broad tradition of political thought, which maintains that individual
autonomy is central to human dignity and/or progress. See infra notes 35-36.
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moral necessity, others must be tolerant.8 According to this account,
tolerance is conceptualized as a moral value emanating from virtues
such as conscience, autonomy, and the right to pursue one's own
conception of the good.9  For most political and legal scholars,
tolerance is, and can only be conceptualized as, a liberal virtue.'
0
However, conceptualizing tolerance as liberal tolerance is similar to
asking for Coke when one really wants a soda. Tolerance, the abstract
concept, has become synonymous with only one of its brands -- the
liberal brand."' As a normative matter, however, it is by no means a
foregone conclusion that tolerance should be conceptualized
exclusively in liberal terms.
A. Defining Tolerance
The concept of tolerance cannot exist outside of a normative
political framework from which it derives its meaning. 12 Tolerance, in
the political sense of the word, is best thought of as a normative value
rather than a descriptive definition. When speaking of tolerance in
political affairs, it is often said that "tolerance is," when what one
should really say is "tolerance requires."'
' 3
8. See supra note 7.
9. See RICHARDS, TOLERATION, supra note 5. See also LOCKE, LETTER ON TOLERATION,
supra note 2; LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 2.
10. See, e.g., David Heyd, Introduction to TOLERATION (David Heyd ed., 1996)
[hereinafter HEYD, TOLERATION] (discussing various arguments about tolerance, all in relation
to the liberal nature of tolerance and in a language that is predominantly liberal).
11. Id.
12. Cf DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 2; DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS, supra note
2. Dworkin claims that we must understand constitutional provisions, including those
promoting tolerance, in light of a foundational normative political framework. For Dworkin,
this foundational principle is liberalism; specifically that branch of liberalism that promotes
the principle of equal concern and respect. David Richards advances a similar argument in
claiming that laws, including laws defining tolerance, exist within normative political
frameworks. He argues that laws must necessarily be based on a foundational liberal
framework and thus be "predictable and orderly constraints that acknowledge and express the
dignity of persons and citizens as free, rational, and equal." RICHARDS, TOLERATION, supra
note 5, at 56.
13. Tolerance is generally thought of as being a moral or political value, which has its
greatest significance in those contexts. Some scholars argue that to treat tolerance of tastes on
par with tolerance of moral, religious or political views degrades the virtuous nature of
tolerance. See, e.g., PETER P. NICHOLSON, Toleration as a Moral Ideal, in ASPECTS OF
TOLERATION (John Horton & Susan Mendus eds., 1985) [hereinafter NICHOLSON,
TOLERATION]. Though there is much validity to this point, it should not be overstated. There
is a whole range of tastes that derive their significance from moral contexts, such as cultural,
religious, and ethnic contexts. Perhaps no one understood this better than Jonathan Swift. In
Gulliver's Travels, Swift shows how the taste for cracking open an egg on its one (and
TOLERANCE AS UNDERSTANDING
Although scholars disagree over the precise definition of
tolerance, American society generally agrees about what tolerance
means and what it should mean. Put simply, Americans believe that
tolerance requires people to put up with other people's tastes, wants,
beliefs, speech, and sometimes, public acts.' 4  This conventional
definition of putting up with distasteful behavior 15 represents various
empirical assumptions about individual behavior. More importantly, it
represents normative assumptions about how individuals should
behave.
16
The standard liberal conception of tolerance consists of two
main components, each of which is a normative requirement for
regarding behavior as tolerant. First, the conventional conception
requires the tolerator to disapprove of others' views, beliefs or
behavior. 17  This may be called the requirement of disapproval.
18
Most liberal theories maintain that tolerance should only apply to those
situations in which the tolerating party disapproves of the conduct or
speech in question. 19  According to these theories, indifference
towards another is not a sufficient precondition.2 ° If an individual
appreciates a difference, then this individual is not considered to be
tolerant. As Peter Nicholson defines it, "Toleration is the virtue of
refraining from exercising one's power with regard to others' opinion
or action although that deviates from one's own over something
important, and although one morally disapproves of it."' 21 Second, the
standard conception requires the tolerator to put up with others' views,
beliefs, and sometimes, behavior. 22  This may be called the
apparently only) proper side can easily be conflated with the political disagreement over
which side of the egg should be cracked open. JONATHAN SWIFT, GULLIVER'S TRAVELS
(Robert Demaria ed., Penguin USA 2003) (1906).
14. Paraphrased from WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1407 (3d ed.
1996). Tolerance comes from the Latin word tolerare, meaning to put up with. Id.
15. Id.
16. These normative assumptions are discussed in detail infra pages 7-15.
17. Most theorists require that the tolerating person disapprove of the beliefs or conduct
of the other in order for that tolerating person to, in fact, be deemed "tolerant." See, e.g.,
NICHOLSON, TOLERATION, supra note 13, at 87; HEYD, TOLERATION, supra note 10; JOHN
HORTON, Toleration, Morality and Harm, in ASPECTS OF TOLERATION, supra note 13; JOHN
HORTON, Toleration as a Virtue, in TOLERATION, supra note 10.
18. "Disapproval" is the term used in this article to encapsulate the liberal requirement
that the tolerator in fact disapprove of the other party's views. See sources cited supra note
17.
19. See sources cited supra note 17.
20. See sources cited supra note 17.
21. NICHOLSON, TOLERATION, supra note 13, at 87 (emphasis added).
22. John Stuart Mill's On Liberty is a restatement of the general social consensus about
what it means to be tolerant, which is, to put up with others, so long as there is no direct harm.
2003]
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requirement of noninterference.23  Liberal theories of tolerance that
only require disapproval and noninterference may be called negative
theories of tolerance.24 These theories are negative because they do
not require affirmative behavior on the part of the tolerator other than
forbearance. 25 This is not to suggest, however, that forbearance is an
easy task, but simply that it is the only task.
The descriptive quality so frequently attributed to tolerance,
that tolerance is restraint, is a reflection of a central empirical
assumption underlying most liberal theory. This central assumption is
that humanity is composed of autonomous individuals with separate,
though shared, desires, wants, and interests.26  While selfhood and
individual autonomy appear to be uncontroversial empirical
assumptions, they are not. The idea that individuals conceptualize
themselves as individual units seems readily apparent, but the reality
of that individuality is quite different.27 Buddhism, for example, does
not conceptualize people in this atomized manner.28 Indeed, there is
The liberal roots of this consensus will be discussed infra pages 13-18. See MILL, ON
LIBERTY, supra note 2; HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 2; LOCKE, LETTER ON TOLERATION,
supra note 2; LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 2. Contemporary
scholarship on tolerance also assumes that the tolerator must put up with objectionable speech
and conduct. See sources cited supra note 17.
23. "Noninterference" is the term used in this article to encapsulate the liberal
requirement of putting up with objectionable behavior. See sources cited supra note 17.
24. The use of the term "negative tolerance" in this article is borrowed from Isaiah
Berlin's conception of negative liberty. Cf ISAIAH BERLIN Two CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY (1958)
(distinguishing between negative and positive conceptions of liberty).
25. See sources cited supra note 17.
26. See supra notes 2-25.
27. The empirical debate over whether humans are individual units will remain an
important issue throughout our discussion; it would be presumptuous, however, to say we can
resolve it. It may just be that the issue is irresolvable. Anthropology, philosophy, biology,
physics, psychology, religion, and other traditions provide ample support for divergent
conceptions of human nature, individuality, and autonomy. Physicists, anthropologists,
philosophers and theologians cannot agree on the empirical criteria. The physicist would want
to make claims about the molecular nature of human beings, the anthropologist would want to
emphasize customs and rites, the philosopher would likely be concerned with epistemological
matters, and the theologian, at least those in the Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition, would be
concerned with metaphysical issues relating to God. Science might support the description of
humans as sub-components of a larger collective. The fact that humans are physically
composed of the same chemicals and compounds that were used to create other individuals,
and the fact that energy and mass can neither be created nor destroyed mitigates the certitude
of any claim that humans have a physical autonomy. Anthropology and religion, with their
emphasis on communal obligations, might also generally support the collective description.
Post-Enlightenment philosophy, on the other hand, with its historic emphasis on the individual
thought process, probably lends greater support to the individual description, as does rational
choice scholarship, much of psychology and perhaps some aspects of evolutionary theory. See
supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
28. A Buddhist writer summarizes the Buddhist conception:
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much support for the argument that "[t]he idea that human nature is
inherently and exclusively individual is itself a product of a cultural
individualistic movement. The idea that the mind and consciousness
are intrinsically individual did not even occur to any one for much of
the greater part of human history.,
29
A corollary empirical assumption of liberal tolerance is that
humanity, as a collection of autonomous individuals with the power to
reason freely, generally exists in a state of conflict.30  This argument,
which is most frequently associated with Hobbes, emphasizes the
impulsive and egoistic nature of individuals.3' Most scholars in the
liberal tradition, relying on this conception of humanity, argue that if
people are atomized units with conflicting wants, and if resources are
finite and limited,32 then the only way to respect these different and
limited wants is to require people to exercise restraint.33  Negative
tolerance is steeped in the pessimism of the Hobbesian conception of
humankind and thus sees conflict as inevitable.
34
When the Buddha confronted the question of identity on the night of his
enlightenment, he came to the radical discovery that we do not exist as
separate beings. He saw into the human tendency to identify with a
limited sense of existence and discovered that this belief in an individual
small self is a root illusion that causes suffering and removes us from the
freedom and mystery of life.
JACK KORNFIELD, A PATH WITH HEART 199 (1993). Similarly, as Buddhist scholar Nancy
Wilson Ross writes:
In Buddhism the idea of the separate self, an "ego," is considered a
mere intellectual invention, not a reality but simply a convenient term for
designating an ever-changing combination, or bundle, or attributes known
as skandhas.
Skandhas, in Buddhist thought, consist of forms, feelings,
perceptions, mental formulations (ideas, wishes dreams) and
consciousness. The constant interplay and interconnection among the
skandhas has the effect of giving a false sense of personal identity and
continuity -- whereas in truth there is no definite 'I' existing by itself,
independent of the ever shifting relation among psychic and physical
forces.
NANCY WILSON Ross, BUDDHISM: A WAY OF LIFE AND THOUGHT 28 (1980).
29. JOHN DEWEY, THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY, 18-19 (1980).
30. See HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 2.
31. Id.
32. This is a common auxiliary assumption under Hobbesian liberal theory. HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN, supra note 2.
33. Much of social contract theory, particularly Hobbesian and Lockean theory, is based
on the premise that without legal norms requiring restraint, these conflicting wants could not
be resolved in a peaceful manner. See, e.g., HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 2; LOCKE,
LETTER ON TOLERATION, supra note 2; LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 2;
RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 2.
34. See sources cited supra note 33.
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The negative conception of tolerance also relies on related
normative claims about how societies can best address this Hobbesian
empirical assumption. The empirical and normative assumptions are
incestuous and thus difficult to divorce. The liberal position that
individualism and autonomy are the paramount virtues of a just society
is an integral part of negative tolerance. 35  The requirements of
noninterference and disapproval are merely by-products of the
normative position that individuals are most fully realized when they
possess the freedom to reason and act autonomously; this is the
bedrock of liberal justice.36  It is important to recognize that
noninterference and disapproval are meaningless concepts without the
liberal empirical assumptions about individuality and conflict, and the
liberal normative assumptions about the value of autonomy and
individualism. The ultimate theoretical success of negative tolerance
lies in its ability to demonstrate the merit of these assumptions. As
Bernard Williams states, "if [negative] toleration as a practice is to be
defended in terms of it being a value, then it will have to appeal to
substantive opinions about the good, in particular, the good of
individual autonomy."
37
35. Liberalism is not a monolithic tradition. Compare, for example, LOCKE, LETTER ON
TOLERATION, supra note 2 with RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 2. But what ties most
liberal theories together are the normative and empirical claims concerning autonomy and
individuality. It is important at the outset to briefly point out two basic categories of liberal
thought, each of which justifies the liberal values of autonomy and individualism in different
ways. Deontological liberals, such as Kant and Rawls, believe that the greatest human
capacity is to freely reason and make decisions autonomously. RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE,
supra note 2, at 22-34. Human dignity, according to deontological liberals, resides in making
autonomous decisions, even when the consequences of those decisions are not beneficial to the
actor. Id. Utilitarian liberals, like Mill, also believe that autonomous decision-making is the
foundation of human dignity. Id. However, unlike deontological liberals, utilitarian liberals
believe that autonomy is a core value because of its beneficial consequences. RAWLS, THEORY
OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 22-34. For utilitarians, autonomy is generally the highest social
value because it generally leads to the greatest collective good. See, e.g., MILL, ON LIBERTY,
supra note 2. Thus, for deontological liberals, the right (autonomous individual action)
precedes the good, but for utilitarian liberals the good precedes this same right. RAWLS,
THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 22-34.
36. David Heyd argues that tolerance rests in part on the principle of the "intrinsic value
of individual integrity." HEYD, TOLERATION, supra note 10, at 13. Heyd's argument draws
from Kant and Rawls, as well as most of liberal thought on the subject. Kant writes that in
order for humans to be most fully realized, they must "[h]ave courage to use [their] own
understanding!" KANT, POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 54. John Rawls agrees: "Kant
held, I believe, that a person is acting autonomously when the principles of his action are
chosen by him as the most adequate possible expression of his nature as a free and equal
rational being." RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 252.
37. BERNARD WILLIAMS, Auto-da-Fi: Consequences of Pragmatism, in READING
RORTY: CRITICAL RESPONSES TO PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE AND BEYOND 25
(Alan Malachowski ed., 1990). I qualified Bernard Williams' quote by adding the word
TOLERANCE AS UNDERSTANDING
It is easy to see why restraint (noninterference) is a virtue in
negative theories. At the very least, under circumstances in which an
angry "tolerator" wants to beat another with a pipe, restraint is the
more virtuous course. The more troubling requirement is disapproval.
Why do most negative theories insist that individuals disapprove of a
behavior in order for them to be considered tolerant? 38 The vast
majority of liberal theorists claim that tolerance should only apply to
those situations in which the tolerating party disapproves of the
conduct or speech in question.39 One possible reason for this claim
lies in the liberal view that it is morally right for individuals to
disapprove of others because they hold views that are either immoral
or antithetical to their own.40 The highest form of liberty, according to
John Stuart Mill, consists of liberty of "the inward domain of
conscience 4 1 and the freedom of "pursuing our own good in our own
way."4 2 Mill frequently argued that humanity's greatest virtue is its
protection of the "liberty of thought and feeling" and the "absolute
freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects." 3
Negative theories of tolerance assume that it is a moral virtue,
if not an obligation, for individuals to live their lives according to their
inner conscience.44 Regardless of the thoughts and belief systems
comprising this inner conscience, the mere possession of a conscience
is often considered virtuous. 45 This freedom to think as one chooses,
to freely discriminate against objectionable ideas, critically judge
"[negative]" because he incorrectly assumes that all forms of tolerance will have to be
defended in terms of the value of individual autonomy. As we will see, some conceptions of
tolerance do not place great emphasis on the value of autonomy.
38. See supra notes 13-21 and accompanying text.
39. See supra notes 13-21 and accompanying text.
40. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
41. MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 2, at 15-16.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. John Locke claims that it is a moral sin for individuals not to live their lives
according to their inner consciences or to arrive at their own views about what is just. See
LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 2, at 189 (". . . if God... would have
men forced to heaven, it must not be by the outward violence of the magistrate on men's
bodies, but the inward constraints of his own spirit on their minds, which are not to be
wrought on by any human compulsion."); LOCKE, LETTER ON TOLERATION, supra note 2, at
395 ("[T]rue and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind, without which
nothing can be acceptable to God.").
45. LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 2, at 189 ("... men must in this
necessarily follow what they themselves thought best, since no consideration could be
sufficient to force a man from or to that which he was fully persuaded was the way to infinite
happiness or infinite misery."). See also RiCHARDS, TOLERATION, supra note 5 (arguing that
the right to conscience is a good in itself).
2003]
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different conceptions of the good, and challenge grossly immoral
individuals, 46 seems as though it should be an unquestionable freedom,
but on closer examination, there are reasons to question this premise.
Some eastern religions, such as Buddhism and Hinduism, teach that it
is unhealthy and unjust for individuals to disapprove of others' views
merely because these views are antithetical or even immoral.47 The
state of disapproval, although unavoidable at times, is a state that
many devout Buddhists and Hindus train much of their lives to
avoid.48 It would be foolish to argue that individuals should not have
inner consciences. However, it is important to recognize that many
religious traditions suggest that having an inner conscience is virtuous,
but only as long as it fits within the moral parameters of other values,
like recognizing the inherent value of others49 or "loving thy
neighbor." 50 Negative theories of tolerance place personal autonomy
upon a pedestal, thus giving the act of disapproval a certain moral
status.51
Although the requirement of noninterference is less
controversial than the requirement of disapproval, noninterference is
based on normative values that are also troubling. Negative theories
begin with a strong presumption that interference with an individual's
mind or body must be justified.52 To borrow from physics, as Hobbes
46. See, e.g., LOCKE, LETTER ON TOLERATION, supra note 2.
47. The writings of Buddhist scholar Thich Nhat Hanh are instructive in this regard. For
those who are unfamiliar with Thich Nhat Hahn, he is a famous Buddhist monk who has
written extensively on Buddhism, fought against the Vietnam War, and was nominated for the
Nobel Peace Prize by Martin Luther King. Throughout his numerous works, Thich Nhat Hahn
has stressed the importance of thinking deeply about the ephemeral nature of difference and
the problems that result from seeing others' views as being both distinct and antithetical from
one's own. THICH NHAT HAHN, LOVE INACTION (1993); THICH NHAT HAHN, LIVING BUDDHA,
LIVING CHRIST (1995); THICH NHAT HAHN, THE HEART OF THE BUDDHA'S TEACHING (1998).
See also KORNFIELD, A PATH WITH HEART, supra note 28; Ross, BUDDHISM: A WAY OF LIFE,
supra note 28, at 28; Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology and Abortion: Toward Love,
Compassion and Wisdom, 77 CALL. REV. 1011-75 (1989) [hereinafter, Colker, Feminism].
48. See sources cited supra note 47 and accompanying text. See generally The
Dhammapada (1967); The Bhagavad Gita (1985).
49. See sources cited supra note 48.
50. This reference is to Jesus Christ's commandment of brotherly/sisterly love. "A new
commandment I give unto you, That ye love one another; as I have loved you, that ye also
love one another." John 13:34 (King James) (unless otherwise noted, all references to the
Bible are taken from The Bible (Authorized King James Version) (Robert Carroll & Steven
Prickett eds., 1997)).
51. See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
52. The central premise of liberalism is that autonomy -- the right not to be interfered
with -- is the essential feature of humanity. Mill, for example, argues that "[t]he only part of
the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In
the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself,
[VOL. 3:1
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and others who view individuals as atoms do, the individual at rest --
that is without the gravitational pull of others' morality -- is the natural
state of affairs.53 Therefore, interference is unnatural and must be
explained.54
The principle of noninterference rests on the values of
autonomy and freedom, and if those values are called into question, so
too is the negative requirement of noninterference. 5 Consider how a
liberal would answer the following question: should a superior moral
being, like God or a human saint, be allowed to encroach upon an
individual's autonomy for the sake of improving that person's well-
being? If Millian liberalism is taken seriously, then as long as the
individual is not causing herself or another any life-threatening harm,
the superior being should not be allowed to encroach on their
autonomy.5 6 This is so even though the encroachment improves that
individual's well-being.5 7  Liberalism considers autonomy and
individualism good in themselves and thus they are given a paramount
moral status.58
When a scholarly argument describes a theory as a negative
theory, invariably there is a positive or affirmative counterpart. 59
Before developing a full critique of the negative conception of
tolerance, it is important to briefly introduce what one might call the
over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign." MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 2, at
12-13. See also HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 2, at 91-111 (outlining broad political norms
prohibiting society from interfering with individuals); LOCKE, LETTER ON TOLERATION, supra
note 2 (arguing that the sovereign has no right to interfere with worship of its Christian
citizens).
53. Hobbes writes:
The Right of Nature, which Writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is
the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for
the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and
consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own Judgement, and
Reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.
By Liberty, is understood, according to the proper signification of the
word, the absence of extemall Impediments: which Impediments, may oft
take away part of a mans power left him, according as his judgement, and
reason shall dictate to him.
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 2, at 91.
54. Hobbes suggests that the interference with a man's natural right to preserve his life,
liberty, and property is in most measures unnatural. Id.
55. MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 2, at 12-13. See also HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note
2, at 91-111; LOCKE, LETrER ON TOLERATION, supra note 2.
56. See supra note 5.
57. Id.
58. See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
59. Cf ISAIAH BERLIN, Two CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY (1958).
2003]
MARGINS
affirmative conception of tolerance. Affirmative theories of
tolerance propose a different standard for assessing the merits of
tolerant behavior.6' They require that the tolerator respect, recognize
or accept the other party and his or her behavior.6  Affirmative
theories of tolerance require the tolerator to refrain from disapproval,
while respecting or recognizing the inherent value in another's speech
or actions. Contrary to negative theories, affirmative ones are deeply
skeptical of foundational differences, which lead to disapproval and
states of mind in which noninterference is the last resort, short of
violence. 63 Affirmative theories conceptualize tolerance as a practice
of avoiding intense disapproval of others.64 A tolerator may build up
respect for another viewpoint prior to the onset of a disagreement, and
thus, intense disapproval may never arise. 65  Negative theories
generally hold that there is an inverse relationship between the
intensity of disapproval and the ability to restrain. In contrast,
affirmative theories suggest that through respect, recognition and
acceptance, an intense disapproval may be overcome prior to needing
to exercise restraint, thus mitigating the difficulty in exercising
restraint.67
60. See supra note 24.
61. The theory of tolerance advocated in this article, tolerance as understanding, is an
example of an affirmative theory of tolerance. Similarly, religious bases of tolerance, for
example, a Christian notion of "loving thy neighbor" is an affirmative conception of tolerance.
The affirmative/negative distinction, however, is not a strict dichotomy. Rather, it is best
thought of as a continuum. For example, as we will explore later in this section, liberals such
as Rawls and Kant present a "more affirmative" conception of tolerance than Mill, Locke or
Hobbes. See infra Part II.A-B.
62. The requirement of respect, recognition or acceptance is discussed infra Part II, in
the context of tolerance as understanding.
63. See discussion of tolerance as understanding infra Part II.
64. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
65. Many scholars write of tolerance as if negative tolerance is the only plausible
conception of tolerance. One author writes:
First, tolerance is not the same as acceptance. Tolerance requires, with
regard to freedom of expression, that we respect the right of people to
express their views; it does not require that we uncritically accept those
views. It would, in fact, be a very foolish form of tolerance which
accepted all viewpoints as being equally valid.
MICHAEL CORBETT, POLITICAL TOLERANCE IN AMERICA 7 (1982). See also NUNN, ET AL.,
TOLERANCE FOR NONCONFORMITY, supra note 6 (suggesting that people might be prejudiced
toward a certain group, yet because they respect their civil liberties, they are tolerant).
66. See sources cited supra note 17.
67. Furthermore, affirmative theories would not permit certain grounds for disapproval.
If disapproval relates solely to a particular characteristic beyond the reasonable control of the
party (for example skin color or gender), it violates the de minimis requirement of recognition
and respect, because there is nothing that party can do to change the "offensive quality." The
disapproval does not relate to a behavior that the tolerated party can change. Negative theories
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Negative and affirmative conceptions of tolerance will be
explored throughout this article. The starting point for a discussion
about negative tolerance is John Stuart Mill's On Liberty, as it aptZ
articulates the most common justifications for negative tolerance.
Mill's commitment to liberal tolerance results from his empirical
assumption that individual character is essential for the progress of
society. 69  Mill claims that, all things being equal, strong natures are
better than weak ones.70 It is not apparent, however, why this should
be so. Strong natures may be less likely to believe they are wrong,
more inclined to harshly question others, and less accepting of views
differing from their own.
John Locke, in line with the Millian view, suggests that
individuals must be allowed to think for themselves and practice their
own inner religious beliefs, because without this internal
individualized approach to faith, the individual cannot attain
salvation.7' Like Mill, Locke justifies tolerance in terms of the
utilitarian benefits of conscience.72 Locke suggests that it is better to
have an individual conscience, even one that is misdirected, than to
claim that a tolerator should refrain from interfering with others. What this generally means is
that the tolerator should not interfere with the other's behavior or views. Even if we were to
accept the negative requirement of noninterference, it loses its meaning when applied to
situations involving immutable characteristics. What is the thing that the tolerator is not
interfering with, a person's manifestation of a skin color? A black person is not engaging in
the behavior of having black skin. In other words, if the other party cannot change the
grounds for disapproval, then the "tolerant" party cannot be considered to be exercising
restraint with respect to a behavior or view; thus they cannot be deemed tolerant. This is
analogous to the "immutable characteristics" concept in equal protection jurisprudence. See
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (holding that race and gender are immutable
characteristics and thus legislation based on these characteristics must be closely scrutinized).
68. See MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 2.
69. Mill writes:
A person whose desires and impulses are his own -- are the expression of
his own nature . . . -- is said to have a character. One whose desires and
impulses are not his own, has no character, no more than a steam-engine
has character. If, in addition to being his own, his impulses are strong, and
are under the government of a strong will, he has an energetic character.
Whoever thinks that individuality of desires and impulses should not be
encouraged to unfold itself, must maintain that society has no need of
strong natures -- is not the better for containing many persons who have
much character -- and that a high general average of energy is not
desirable.
Id. at 70.
70. Id.
71. See sources cited supra notes 45-47. See also Amy R. McReady, The Ethical
Individual: An Historical Alternative to Contemporary Conceptions of Self, 90 AM. POL. SCI.
REv. 90-102 (1986) (explaining the importance of individual conscience to Locke's theories).
72. See sources cited supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
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have no strong conscience at all.73 According to Locke, without a
strong individual conscience, an individual has no prospect of attaining
salvation.7 4 For example, if a good-natured individual allows another
to decide which religion the individual should practice and in what
manner, the good-natured individual will not be saved because that
individual is not thinking about God for him or herself. According to
this foundational premise of Lockean liberal theory, allowing others to
correctly decide matters of faith for you is as great a sin as wrongly
deciding these matters for yourself.7 5  Disapproval is based on the
Hobbesian and Millian empirical assumption that difference and
conflict are inherent human qualities that, far from being primarily
harmful, are necessary for human advancement. 76 Disapproval is more
than just an empirical assumption. It is an acceptance of this reality
and a normative argument in favor of difference and character.
It can be argued, however, that disapproval has no moral status
or normative underpinning. It can further be argued that requiring
disapproval is merely a practical way of identifying circumstances in
which exercising restraint is more virtuous than not exercising
restraint.77 In other words, disapproval is not a virtue, but a condition
precedent signaling the need for restraint. 78  According to this
argument, disapproval is a means for assessing the difficulty in
exercising restraint. Moreover, it assumed that there is an inverse
relationship between the intensity of the disapproval and the ability to
restrain.79 In other words, the more intolerable the behavior, the less
likely the tolerator will be able to exercise restraint.
Although there is some merit to this argument, it must be
recognized that liberals, as a matter of moral necessity, require people
to disapprove of one another in order to be deemed virtuous.80
73. See sources cited supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text. See also RICHARD
VERNON, THE CAREER OF TOLERATION: JOHN LOCKE, JONAS PROAST, AND AFTER (1997)
[hereinafter VERNON, THE CAREER OF TOLERATION]; SUSAN MENDUS, TOLERATION AND THE
LIMITS OF LIBERALISM (1989) [hereinafter MENDUS, THE LIMITS OF LIBERALISM].
74. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
76. For Mill, human society advances, in part, through our right to judge and disapprove
of others' beliefs. MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 2, at 67-78. For Locke, we attain salvation
through our unfettered right to search our own consciences. LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING
TOLERATION, supra note 2, at 186-93.
77. See, e.g., HEYD, TOLERATION, supra note 10.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 2. See also supra note 21 and
accompanying text.
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Because of the emphasis on autonomy and reason, liberals place a
higher moral status on the act of critically disapproving of some moral
claim, but exercising restraint, than the act of never being judgmental
in the first place. 81 Under liberal tolerance, a racist who disapproves
of certain people based solely on their skin color may be commended
for his restraint, while those who are truly incapable of disapproving
based on race are not even conceptualized as "tolerant."
82
Paradoxically, a person who is accepting of different views or is
incapable of racism is deemed less tolerant than the racist.83 The
reason for this is that liberals require individuals to have character and
to exercise critical judgment about fundamental matters. 84
Disagreement is not only unavoidable, according to this perspective, it
is a necessary virtue for discriminating between moral and immoral
beliefs and promoting individual character, as well as social
progress. 85  The requirement of disapproval is not just a pragmatic
requirement needed to give meaning to restraint. Rather, it is a moral
extension of the liberal premise that regardless of the substance of a
person's views, that person should have the right to exercise his or her
innermost thoughts and personal conscience.
86
B. Mill, Locke, Kant, and Rawls
It is to Mill, Locke, Kant and Rawls that liberal tolerance is
most in debt. John Stuart Mill's On Liberty presents a negative
conception of tolerance closely paralleling the "Live and Let Live"
credo.87 Mill makes numerous utilitarian arguments for why one
81. See sources cited supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
82. JOHN HORTON, Toleration as a Virtue, in TOLERATION, supra note 10 (questioning
the virtue of describing the self-restrained bigot as tolerant).
83. Id.
84. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 36, 41-45, 52-56 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 36, 41-45, 52-56 and accompanying text.
87. Early on in his essay, Mill gives his reader a cogent synopsis of his essay:
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should tolerate difference. First, he claims that suppression of diverse
viewpoints deprives humanity of potential truths, and that given the
individual's propensity for fallibility, suppression of truths will be all
too frequent a phenomenon.8 8  Second, he claims that even if the
viewpoint is wrong, immoral, or untruthful, its suppression limits our
ability to see the clarity of our own truths through a thoughtful
examination and juxtaposition of falsehoods. 89 Individuals, according
to this argument, cannot appreciate a truth to its full extent by merely
accepting its validity. Individuals must experience it by wading
through the truths and untruths of an issue.90 In a similar vein, it.is
often the case that wrong beliefs will consist of part truths, which may
complement one's partially true beliefs. Suppression of these beliefs
keeps one from realizing the entirety of his or her own truths. Third,
Mill posits the provocative idea that suppression and social intolerance
increase the resiliency and tenacity of faulty ideas that would
otherwise die out.9 1 That suppression may actually strengthen the
resolve of repressed ideas and raise otherwise unpersuasive outsiders
to the status of courageous martyrs.92 According to Mill, there is less
to fear by permitting individuals to publicly articulate unpersuasive
untruths, than outright suppressing them.
93
The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle .... that the
sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively in
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-
protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is
to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a
sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear
because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him
happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or
even right .... The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is
amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which
merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over
himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.
MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 2, at 12-13.
88. Id. at 21 ("... the opinion which it is attempted to suppress by authority may
possibly be true.").
89. Id. at 25C(... [t]he steady habit of correcting and completing his own opinion by
collating it with those of others, so far from causing doubt and hesitation in carrying it into
practice, is the only stable foundation for a just reliance on it ... .
90. Id.
91. Id. at 38-39.
92. Id.
93. Even though Mill states that it is less dangerous to tolerate untruthful ideas, than to
suppress them, he does not unequivocally argue, as many often wrongly suggest he does, that
truth will prevail in a free marketplace for ideas. Rather, he writes, "It is a piece of idle
sentimentality that truth, merely as truth, has any inherent power denied to error, of prevailing
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Although eloquent and at times persuasive, Mill's theory raises
a number of concerns. Mill conceptualizes people as individual units
with firmly established "rights of noninterference." 94 These rights of
noninterference are not, however, without significant cost. The fact
that an individual has a right to prohibit some other individual from
interfering with him or her, also means that the other individual is
prohibited from interacting with him or her, even though they might
both mutually benefit from that interaction. Stated differently, Mill
prioritizes the right of noninterference over the right of the interfering
party to engage or commune with the party exercising his or her right
of noninterference. 95 There is no principled reason to believe that one
right should be prioritized over the other unless circumstances exist in
which engagement outweighs noninterference.
96
John Locke promotes a similar conception of tolerance, though
based on different reasons. Whereas Mill was concerned more with
freedom of expression and speech, Locke, a devout Puritan, was
writing at a time when religious intolerance was the utmost issue, and
therefore was more concerned with religious toleration. 97  Locke's
entire theory of tolerance rests on the notion that individuals must be
free to worship as they choose, so that they may pursue eternal
salvation in the way they see fit.98  In An Essay Concerning
against the dungeon and the stake." MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 2, at 34. See also KARL
POPPER, Toleration and Intellectual Responsibility, in ON TOLERATION (Susan Mendus &
David Edwards eds., 1987) (agreeing with Mill's argument that a free marketplace may not
necessarily lead to truth).
94. MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 2, at 34. Mill's maxim is: "The individual is not
accountable to society for his actions, insofar as these concern the interests of no person but
himself." Id. at 108.
95. See discussion infra Part II giving reasons why moral obligation of engagement may
outweigh noninterference.
96. This Millian view of noninterference is prevalent in constitutional law, as well as
American political culture more generally. It would be thought absurd if a municipality
passed an ordinance requiring individuals to listen politely for a reasonable amount of time to
a canvassing Jehovah's Witness who rings one's doorbell. In fact, even though freedom of
speech is a favored liberal value, where it encroaches upon the individual's private bubble, of
which one's home is an extension, it can be tightly regulated. See, e.g., Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
97. David Wootton, Introduction to JOHN LOCKE, THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN
LOCKE 7-122 (David Wootton ed., 1993) [hereinafter Wooton, Introduction to JOHN LOCKE].
See also VERNON, THE CAREER OF TOLERATION, supra note 73; MENDUS, THE LIMITS OF
LIBERALISM, supra note 73; LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 2; LOCKE,
LETTER ON TOLERATION, supra note 2.
98. Locke writes:
That in speculations and religious worship every man hath a perfect,
uncontrollable liberty which he may freely use, without, or contrary to the
magistrate's command, without any guilt or sin at all; provided always that
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Toleration, Locke states that opinions relating to the manner in which
God is to be worshiped should be entitled to "complete" toleration.
99
Locke argued that as a matter of law, the magistrate's duties were
limited to civil matters, such as the preservation of peace.100  The
magistrate's duties did not extend to an individual's relationship with
God. 10 In addition to lacking this de jure power over heavenly
matters, the magistrate also lacked the de facto power. 10 2  In other
words, if the magistrate coerced his subjects into making an improper
decision regarding the proper manner of worship, he had no ability to
rectify matters in the other world. 10 3  Also, because Locke believed
that the magistrate was just as fallible as his subjects, and equally
powerless with respect to rectifying mistakes in the other world, the
magistrate could not properly force his subjects to accept a particular
conception of Christianity.' °4 Hence, Locke defends tolerance on the
basis that the magistrate is incapable of truly persuading someone to
be faithful. 105
it be all done sincerely and out of conscience to God, according to the best
of his knowledge and persuasion.
LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 2, at 190-91.
99. Id. at 202-03. These opinions do not include opinions denying the existence of God,
as Locke believed that one could not be an atheist and at the same time be moral. Locke
considered God the foundation of all morality and a belief in God was required to be a moral
citizen, that is, one who could uphold contracts and swear oaths. Toleration extended to the
manner in which people worshiped -- their formal ceremonies, the time and place of their
worship and their beliefs about matters not fundamental to Christianity or the existence of
God. Id.
100. Id. at 186-87.
101. Id. Locke argues that it would be an "absurdity if not a contradiction" for a
Christian to think of a monarch as having an absolute power with respect to matters relating to
God. Locke claims that the power of the magistrate is limited to the preservation and welfare
of his subjects on earth. Id. See also LOcKE, LETTER ON TOLERATION, supra note 2, at 394-
96.
102. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
103. LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 2, at 188 ("Whatever evil I
suffer by obeying him in other things he can make me amends in this world, but if he forces
me to a wrong religion he can make me no reparation in the other world .). See also
LOCKE, LETTER ON TOLERATION, supra note 2, at 394-96.
104. LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 2, at 188 (The magistrate has
"no more certain or more infallible knowledge of the way to attain [salvation] than I myself,
where we are both equally inquirers, both equally subjects, and wherein he can give me no
security that I shall not, nor make me any recompense if I do, miscarry."). See also LOCKE,
LETTER ON TOLERATION, supra note 2, at 394-96.
105. Locke's theory of tolerance is a puzzling one, in part, because he is arguably the
father of modem liberalism, yet his views on tolerance lack a true coherent liberal structure.
Wootton, Introduction to JOHN LOCKE, supra note 97, at 7, 9-12, 38-41. Unlike most liberal
theories of tolerance (Mill's for example), Locke does not have a compelling argument for
why tolerance is a moral liberal virtue. As Susan Mendus notes, it is not so much that
tolerance is a virtue, but that intolerance is unnecessary, because coercing individuals into a
TOLERANCE AS UNDERSTANDING
Mill and Locke's theories of tolerance fall squarely within the
negative conception of tolerance. But other liberal theories, such as
those of Immanuel Kant, John Rawls, and Ronald Dworkin, overlap
with affirmative conceptions of tolerance.' °6  Kant, Rawls, and
Dworkin's theories share more in common with affirmative
conceptions because they emphasize the concept of equality.'
0 7
Therefore, they regard respect and recognition as important
components of a just society.10 8 Tolerance, according to Kant, Rawls,
and Dworkin is not just a function of the individual's right to
conscience or autonomy, as Locke and Mill might contend, but a
function of the individual's right to be treated fairly and equally. 1
09
Kant's theory of morality grows out of his famous categorical
imperative: reason dictates that individuals should act according to just
laws that can be universally willed. Kant states:
No-one can compel me to be happy in accordance with
his conception of the welfare of others, for each may
seek his happiness in whatever way he sees fit, so long
as he does not infringe upon the freedom of others to
pursue a similar end which can be reconciled with the
freedom of everyone else within a workable general law
religious belief, even the correct one, will not allow them to achieve salvation. MENDUS, THE
LIMITS OF LIBERALISM, supra note 73; LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 2;
LOCKE, LETTER ON TOLERATION, supra note 2. Also confounding the analysis of Locke is his
great skepticism about the ability of individuals to find the true path to salvation. VERNON,
THE CAREER OF TOLERATION, supra note 73. Tolerance, for Locke, is necessary because
leaders will more times than not lead individuals towards an incorrect path, which results in
eternal damnation. Id.
106. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS, supra note 2; DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 2;
KANT, POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 2; RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 2; RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 2.
107. Kant's categorical imperative qualifies autonomy in terms of equality, KANT,
POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 74. Dworkin's provides a similar qualification:
The central concept of my argument will be the concept not of liberty but
of equality .... Government must not only treat people with concern and
respect, but with equal concern and respect. It must not distribute goods
or opportunities unequally on the ground that some citizens are entitled to
more because they are worthy of more concern.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 272-73. Rawls also qualifies autonomy in a
similar fashion. See generally RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 2.
108. KANT, POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 74; DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS, supra
note 2, at 272-73; RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 2.
109. See sources cited supra note 108.
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-- i.e., he must accord to others the same right as he
enjoys himself. l" 0
Kant claims that the capacity to decide one's conception of the good,
regardless of what that choice is, is the highest expression of
humankind."i ' By obeying the universal laws of reason, rather than
perceptions of individual benefits, a person strives to be a fully
realized, autonomous, moral creature. 11 2 This justification for liberal
tolerance is much richer, and consequently more persuasive than either
Mill's or Locke's theory, because equality tempers autonomy."I3 Kant
suggests that autonomy is constrained by the value of equal concern
for everyone's right to autonomy, as well as the moral concern for a
duty-bound system of justice.
John Rawls, in his seminal work, A Theory of Justice, builds on
Kant's views of equality in fashioning a theory of justice. 1 4 Rawls'
theory of justice is based on the mental construct of the "original
position,"'1 15  a hypothetical initial situation in which rational
individuals agree on the principles of justice." 6  Individuals in this
social contract situation choose their principles of justice without
knowing their social positions, material wealth, natural attributes, or
other features of their identity." l7 Because individuals in the original
position do not know what their religious and moral views will be, or
whether they will be a member of a majoritarian religion, political, or
ethnic group, they agree in the original position to protect rights such
as freedom of conscience, religion, and speech. 1 8  Tolerance is
110. KANT, POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 74.
111. Id.
112. Kant writes:
[Man] must indeed make every possible conscious effort to ensure that no
motive derived from the desire for happiness imperceptibly infiltrates his
conceptions of duty. To do this, he should think rather of the sacrifices
which obedience to duty (i.e. virtue) entails than of the benefits he might
reap from it, so that he will comprehend the imperative of duty in its full
authority as a self-sufficient law, independent of all other influences,
which requires unconditional obedience.
Id. at 64.
113. DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 266-78. See also RICHARDS,
TOLERATION, supra note 5, at 55-57. The arguments for why a tolerance where equality
tempers autonomy is normatively more desirable will be developed more fully in the next
section. See infra Part 1I.B.
114. RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 2.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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justified on the grounds that it allows individuals, within reasonable
bounds, to pursue their own conception of the good, so that they may
have the opportunity to fulfill their highest moral obligation."
19
In Political Liberalism, the follow-up to A Theory of Justice,
Rawls expands and elucidates his theory of justice as fairness. 120
Rawls' political liberalism calls for a society in which conceptions of
the good are allowed to differ, but in which there is an "overlapping
consensus" on the fundamental principles of justice and the
fundamental structures of state. 121  Rawls tries to create a political
system that ensures that there will be political consensus over
fundamental matters of justice and political tolerance for matters that
are less fundamental in this regard. 122  His is a sophisticated theory
which nobly attempts to include everyone in a public discussion about
the universal principles of justice, while preserving for each individual
a very real enclave in which their religious, moral, and philosophical
views can be practiced. 123  To the extent Rawls' theory is found
wanting, it is due to the fact that he creates a formal division, one that
is empirically untenable, between religious political morality and
secular political morality.
124
119. Rawls, as well as other liberal thinkers, has been criticized by communitarian
thinkers for his treatment of abstracted individuals. Although not a monolithic school of
thought (see for example, RUSSELL HARDIN, ONE FOR ALL 183-213 (1995)), communitarians
generally claim that liberals incorrectly regard individuals as abstracted beings capable of
generating their own conception of the good through a reasoning process that is disconnected
from their social environment. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1998) (1982); CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN
SCIENCES (1985); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (1981).
Individuals, according to Charles Taylor and Alasdair Macintyre, are defined and constituted
by their social roles as mothers, doctors, Americans, farmers, friends, etc. Their goals and
understanding of the good are shaped by, if not determined by, their identification with these
social roles and the cultures they live in. Id.
120. See generally RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 2, at 4-22.
121. The society is one based on cooperation and the virtues of citizenship. Citizenship
morally obligates individuals to be reasonable -- that is they must understand that principles of
justice should be capable of being universalized. Id. at 58-72. And citizens must be rational,
that is they must understand their own conception of the good. Id. at 72-77. These two
principles of citizenship are the pillars on which Rawls develops his understanding of public
reason. Id. at 212-54. If citizens are endowed with these capacities, they may effectively
participate in a forum of public reason, a forum in which they rationally debate issues
concerning constitutional matters and the principles of justice. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, LovE AND POWER (1991) [hereinafter PERRY, LOVE AND
POWER] (criticizing political liberalism for being antagonistic towards conceptions of the good
based on religious morality). See also Gary Remer, Humanism, Liberalism, & the Skeptical
Case for Religious Toleration, XXV POLITY No. 1, at 21, 37 (1992) ("For contemporary
liberals like Rawls, religious truth lies outside the realm of common sense .... ).
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In concluding this section, it is important to highlight the
differences between the Millian brand of liberalism' 25 and the Kantian-
Rawlsian brand. 26 In defense of the Millian brand, political theorist
Richard Sinopoli contends that Millian liberalism "grounds rights in
interests and takes liberty to be the principle political value because it
is so vital to advancing our interest as autonomous (or potentially
autonomous beings)," whereas Kantian liberalism "grounds rights not
in interests but in ... our status as persons.'' 27 Sinopoli sides with
Millian liberalism because, according to him, the Millian view does
not require us to foster others' self-respect. 28  According to this
reasoning, the Millian view is better because we are not concerned
with self-respect, but rather with taking what we need from other
individuals in order to further our own goals. 129 Like Mill and other
liberals, Sinopoli supports a thick-skinned version of liberal tolerance
best characterized as "Live and Let Live.' 30 The sections that follow
will compare this version of tolerance with a version based on norms
of understanding.
II. TOLERANCE AS UNDERSTANDING
This section of the article advances tolerance as understanding
as a theoretical device for critiquing and improving upon standard
liberal accounts of tolerance. Furthermore, it addresses whether
tolerance as understanding is a viable theory for individual moral
125. See supra pp. 16-18.
126. See supra pp. 20-23.
127. Richard Sinopoli, Thick-Skinned Liberalism: Redefining Civility, 89 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 612,612-13 (1995).
128. Id. at 618-19.
129. Sinopoli writes:
Respect for others does not require that we affirm their ends or buck up
their self-esteem, only that we take them seriously and recognize that they
may have something to teach us. At some further point . . . disgust,
revulsion -- indeed, a full range of emotions associated with moral
disapprobation -- may be in order. If we are wrongly subjected to
expressions of such emotions, Mills urges us to be thick-skinned enough
to carry on our plan of life against popular pressures. To fail to do so is a
moral failure of timidity, not simply an understandable psychological
response. Yet it is also a failure of timidity not to lend our wisest counsel
to others who are too ready to conform or to challenge themselves to lead
more satisfactory lives.
Id.
130. MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 2, at 12-13.
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behavior. Although the theory of tolerance developed in this section
shares much in common with liberal tolerance, this section will
attempt to highlight the primary differences between the two theories
to examine their relative strengths and weaknesses. In light of this,
this section will present a stylized account of liberal tolerance, which
is primarily negative in nature, and a stylized account of tolerance
based on norms of understanding, which is primarily affirmative in
nature. As will be discussed, the most important difference is that
tolerance as understanding claims that compassion, empathy, humility
and other values associated with understanding, are the paramount
moral principles for individual behavior, whereas liberal tolerance
claims that autonomy and reason are the paramount virtues. Another
significant difference is that liberal tolerance generally purports to be
neutral with respect to individuals' moral choices, whereas tolerance
as understanding promotes a specific form of morality based on
principles of understanding. 131  Tolerance as understanding is
primarily grounded in mutual obligations, such as understanding,
whereas liberal tolerance is primarily grounded in the rights
individuals have to autonomously pursue their own conception of the
good. 132
131. It is important to briefly point out, at the onset, that those liberal thinkers that claim
liberalism is a "neutral" theory of how humans may pursue their own good, strongly overstate
their position. See SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE, supra note 119 (arguing
that liberalism is not neutral). Liberal theories of tolerance and law derive legitimacy from
claims about their neutrality with respect to an individual's pursuit of her own good. But, at
best, liberalism, and the norms of law and tolerance it engenders, may only claim a qualified
neutrality. First, liberal theories promote substantive moral values such as individual
autonomy, personal conscience, private decision-making, free speech and other values. Id.
See also HERBERT MARCUSE, Repressive Tolerance, in A CRITIQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE
(1969). Liberalism, for example, is not neutral with respect to an individual's consensual
desire to relinquish her own autonomy in exchange for a communal identity. Charles Taylor,
The Politics of Recognition in MULTICULTURALISM: THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION (Amy
Gutterman ed., 1994). Mill, for example, claims that one cannot rightfully cede this liberty
interest of autonomy. MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 2. Second, liberal procedures and norms
(such as "free speech for all") that result in substantive inequalities can hardly be considered
"neutral," if that term is thought to mean fair, non-arbitrary or just. Laurence H. Tribe, The
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980). If
facially non-arbitrary and impartial procedures continually result in the entrenchment of an
unjust status quo or result in substantive inequalities, then the claim on behalf of these
procedures that they are neutral, and thus virtuous, is unsound. Id.
132. See, e.g., supra notes 2-6, 36-43.
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A. Defining Understanding: Religious Notions of "Ecumenical Love"
In order to gain insight into how individuals have historically
justified and practiced values associated with understanding, one must
first try to define the concept of ecumenical love. The definition of
"love" presented here is similar to certain religious definitions of love,
principally, certain forms of Buddhist and Christian "brotherly"
love. 1-3  These religious or spiritual conceptions of love are utilized
herein because, as a matter of historical practice, they are the most
well defined and accessible. 134  Moreover, some people have
demonstrated a reasonable capacity to live according to them. 135 This
section begins with the Christian conception of love, as Christianity
has been the dominant religion in America. 36  The Book of John
133. See infra notes 137-38.
134. Anthony E. Cook, The Death of God in American Pragmatism and Realism:
Resurrecting the Value of Love in Contemporary Jurisprudence, 82 GEO. L.J. 1431, 1434
(1994) [hereinafter Cook, Value of Love]; STEPHEN CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 23
(1993); LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 2; LOCKE, LETTER ON
TOLERATION, supra note 2.
135. Religious arguments are generally banned from academic discussions. Interestingly,
however, Anthony Cook writes:
There was a time in Western history in which a discussion of the common
good independent of religious "truth" was considered ludicrous. Today,
the presumption is reversed. The development of Western liberal
secularism has relegated religious discourse to a subordinate status among
the otherwise legitimate views of what the common good entails.
Cook, Value of Love, supra note 134, at 1434. In a similar vein, law professor Stephen
Carter amusingly notes, "One good way to end a conversation -- or start an argument -- is to
tell a group of well-educated professionals that you hold a political position (preferably a
controversial one, such as being against abortion or pornography) because it is required by
your understanding of God's will." CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF, supra note 134, at
23.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, because the greatest insights into understanding and
love and the interdependent human obligations that flow from them are from religious
traditions, the theory of tolerance developed in this Part draws from these traditions. I do not,
however, attempt to "justify" tolerance as understanding using religious arguments. The
reliance on religious principles should not trouble moral theorists, particularly liberal ones. In
the same way that a liberal theorist might dismiss John Locke's religious views, but accept
those liberal ideals that were only made possible by Locke's rigid assumptions about God and
religion, a theorist may value the moral claims underlying tolerance as understanding, without
accepting the associated implications about God and religion. LoCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING
TOLERATION, supra note 2; LOCKE, LETTER ON TOLERATION, supra note 2.
136. The notion that tolerance in America may be based on mutual obligations arising
from understanding was not lost on the Founders. In the Virginia Constitutional Convention
of 1776, George Mason, the initial drafter of the religious liberty clause for Virginia's
Constitution, proposed the following clause:
... all men should enjoy the fullest toleration in the exercise of religion,
according to the dictates of conscience, unpunished and unrestrained by
the magistrate, unless, under colour of religion, any man disturb the peace,
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indicates that Christ said, "A new commandment I give unto you, that
ye love one another; as I have loved you, that ye also love one
another." Christ consistently preaches the virtues of "loving thy
neighbor" throughout the New Testament.' 
37
Buddhism defines "love," or the Buddhist term "loving-
kindness," with a similar referent, "God's love of humans."' 38  The
Dhammapada, a Buddhist holy text, asks individuals to practice a
"godlike" or "Christ-like" level of compassion: "[b]e gentle with
anger, do good to evil; be generous to the miser, truthful to the liar."'
' 39
In line with Buddhism and Christianity, the Bhagavad Gita, the Hindu
holy text, holds that God is in everyone. 140 It states: "I am the Self in
the heart of every creature. ' ' 141 Similarly, the Koran, Islam's holy text,
states "[1]et the good which ye bestow be for parents, and kindred, and
orphans, and the poor, and the wayfarer; and whatever good ye do, of a
truth God knoweth."'' 42 And the Talmud, Jewish law, requires Jews to
emulate God -- that is they are required to be merciful, just and
the happiness, or safety of society. And that it is the mutual duty of all to
practice Christian forbearance, love, and charity towards each other.
City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 555 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(citing Committee Draft of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, 1 Papers of George
Mason 284-5 (R. Rutland ed., 1970)) (emphasis added).
137. In the Book of Matthew, we are told that Christ said:
Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul,
and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment. And the
second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. On these
two commandments hang all the law and the prophets.
Matthew 22:37-40. See also John 13:34; John 15:13, 15:17; Matthew 22:37-40; Mark
12:30-31; John 4:7-16; Romans 13:8.
The New Jerusalem version of the Bible states Christ's command even more forcefully,
"you must love one another, just as I have loved you." This famous injunction comes from the
Old Testament, "thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." Leviticus 19:18. The view that
humans should try to love each other as God or Christ loves humans, however, is an even
stronger obligation. Compare John 13:34, with Leviticus 19:18.
138. Thich Nhat Hanh, writes, "When we see someone overflowing with love and
understanding... we know that they are very close to the Buddha and to Jesus Christ." THICH
NHAT HAHN, LIVING BUDDHA, LIVING CHRIST 145 (1995). See also THICH NHAT HAHN, LOVE
IN ACTION (1993); THICH NHAT HAHN, THE HEART OF THE BUDDHA'S TEACHING 7 (1998). See
also KORNFIELD, A PATH WITH HEART, supra note 28, at 7; Ross, BUDDHISM: A WAY OF LIFE,
supra note 28, at 28; Colker, Feminism, supra note 47, at 1011-75.
139. The Dhammapada 115 (1967).
140. The Bhagavad Gita (1985).
141. Gita 10:20. The Gita also teaches that individuals should be concerned with others'
welfare and restrain their anger towards others. "Strive constantly to serve the welfare of the
world; by devotion to selfless work one attains the supreme goal of life. Do your work with
the welfare of others always in mind." Gita 3:19-20.
142. The Koran 2:215-18 (Alan Jones ed., 1994).
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compassionate. 143 According to Jewish law, "[l]ove of one's fellow
man which is not motivated and nourished by the realization that man
was created in God's image, is doomed to failure."
144
Based on these religious conceptions, ecumenical love may be
conceptualized as a moral requirement to try to treat others with a
"godlike" level of reverence and compassion. In other words, to the
extent humanly possible, we should care about others, including those
we do not like, as we believe God cares about us. For those who do
not believe in God, love may be conceptualized as an aspirational
mindset in which we should care about others in the same way that we
would want a fictional or idealized god, one who is supremely
compassionate and forgiving, to care about us.
Because ecumenical love and understanding are abstract
concepts it is important to give these concepts some concrete human
expression. 14 5  That is, it is important to delineate some specific
individual moral obligations arising from norms of understanding.
This article suggests five moral obligations that are representative of
obligations under possible theories of tolerance based on
understanding. These five obligations are not intended to be the only
possible list of obligations. Rather, they are merely one interpretation
of tolerance as the practice of understanding. The five moral
obligations are empathetic reasoning,146 compassion,
147 sacrifice,148
forgiveness, 149 and humility. 150
B. Empathetic Reasoning, Compassion, Sacrifice, Forgiveness and
Humility
Empathetic reasoning requires a tolerator to empathize with the
other party, that is, to identify with the concerns of the other party, as
if those concerns were the tolerator's own concerns. 151 Generally, this
143. ZELIG PLISKIN, LOVE YOUR NEIGHBOR 143,385,428 (1977).
144. Id. at 19.
145. It is important to recognize, however, that ecumenical love and understanding are no
more abstract than the liberal conception of autonomy or reason.
146. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
147. See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
148. See infra note 172.
149. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
150. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
151. The conventional understanding of empathy conveys the basic notion of empathy I
wish to examine here. The dictionary defines empathy as "the projection of one's own
personality into the personality of another in order to understand the person better ...."
WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 445 (3d ed. 1996). I would qualify this by
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means that the tolerator must attempt to step outside of himself or
herself to view the contested moral issue from the perspective of the
tolerated party.' 52  Ideally, an effective practitioner of empathetic
reasoning would be able to explain the tolerated party's moral
position, social circumstances, world-views, and empirical evidence as
skillfully as their own. The practitioner must justify the benefits of the
beliefs, behaviors, or lifestyles to the other person. The effort used to
understand one's own views should be equal to the effort used to
understand alternate views. According to the obligation to reason
empathetically, it would be morally unacceptable to contest a moral
position without first making a reasonable effort to understand that
position.
153
Stepping outside of one's self to view a contested moral issue
is a difficult, if not impossible, task for many theorists.'5 4 However, in
Buddhist and Hindu traditions, religious individuals strive daily to
remove themselves from personal identities and desires, which may
lead to substantive disagreements with others.' 55 The core principle of
non-attachment or detachment in these religious traditions suggests
that stepping outside of one's self to appreciate another's conception
of the world is supremely virtuous and beneficial to both sides of a
suggesting that empathetic reasoning requires the understanding of another by viewing a
contested moral issues from that person's perspective.
152. As will be discussed throughout this section, I draw on a number of sources in
support of the importance of empathetic reasoning to tolerance. Among others, I draw on
religious texts, see sources cited supra notes 142-48; legal scholars who discuss the value of
empathy in law, for example, Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV.
1574 (1987), and Cook, Value of Love, supra note 134; feminist jurisprudence and political
theory, for example, Colker, Feminism, supra note 47, and Sibyl A. Schwarzenbach, Rawls,
Hegel and Communitarianism, 19 POL. THEORY 539-71 (1991) [hereinafter, Schwarzenbach,
Communitarianism]; the deliberative dialogue literature, for example, PERRY, LOVE AND
POWER, supra note 124; some liberal writings, IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE
METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (H.J. Paton trans., 1964) [hereinafter KANT, METAPHYSIC OF
MORALS]; RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 337-38; HEYD, TOLERATION, supra
note 10, at 12; and other writings justifying political tolerance in terms of empathy for others,
for example, MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT (1964); MARTIN LUTHER KING,
JR., THE TRUMPET OF CONSCIENCE (1968); MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., I HAVE A DREAM:
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES THAT CHANGED THE WORLD (James M. Washington ed., Harper
Collins 1992) (1986); MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE WISDOM OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
(Alex Ayres ed., 1993); ROBERT MCAFEE BROWN, UNEXPECTED NEWS: READING THE BIBLE
WITH THIRD WORLD EYES (The Westminster Press 1984) (1920).
153. See sources cited supra note 152.
154. For Rawls, the obligation can only be treated as a hypothetical endeavor. See
RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 2 (discussing the initial situation). For others, like
Sandel, Taylor, and Maclntyre, the obligation to step outside one's self is nothing more than
an incomprehensible fiction. See source cited supra note 119.
155. See sources cited supra notes 29, 48.
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dispute. 56  Support for non-attachment or detachment may also be
found in the deliberative dialogue literature, 157 as well as some liberal
thought.158
This process of empathetic reasoning relies heavily on the
notion of "decoupling" sin from the sinner. 159 There is an important
156. As Thich Nhat Hanh writes:
We have to believe that by engaging in dialogue with the other person, we
have the possibility of making a change within ourselves, that we can
become deeper. Dialogue is not a means for assimilation in the sense that
one side expands and incorporates the other into its "self." Dialogue must
be practiced on the basis of the "non-self." We have to allow what is
good, beautiful, and meaningful in the other's tradition to transform us.
THICH NHAT HAHN, LIVING BUDDHA, LIVING CHRIST 9 (1995). Christ's Sermon on the
Mount suggests a similar foundation for empathetic reasoning: "Love your enemies, bless
them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use
you, and persecute you." Matthew 5:44.
157. In Love and Power, Michael Perry writes:
Any community or person for which or whom love of neighbor is a
constitutive ideal should understand that openness to the Other -- to the
stranger, the outsider -- in deliberative dialogue facilitates as well as
expresses such love: I can hardly love the Other -- the real other, in all her
particularity -- unless I listen to her ....
PERRY, LOVE AND POWER, supra note 124, at 50.
158. Kant similarly writes:
[We should acquire] the mental habit ... of detaching ourselves from the
subjective and personal conditions of our judgment, which cramp the mind
of so many others, and reflect upon our judgment from a universal point of
view which we can do only by adopting the point of view of others.
KANT, POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 2, at 255 (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF
JUDGMENT I, 2 § 40; AAV, 294f). See also KANT, METAPHYSIC OF MORALS, supra note 152.
Rawls likewise believes that "to respect another as a moral person is to try to understand his
aims and interests from his standpoint and to present him with considerations that enable him
to accept the constraints on his conduct." RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 338.
And David Heyd writes:
I call toleration a perceptual virtue, because it involves a shift of attention
rather than an overall judgment. Tolerant people overcome the drive to
interfere in the life of another not because they come to believe that the
reasons for restraint are weightier than the reasons for disapproval, but
because the attention is shifted from the object of disapproval to the
humanity or the moral standing of the subject before them.
HEYD, TOLERATION, supra note 10, at 12.
159. In his autobiography, Mahatma Gandhi states that "hating the sin and not the sinner"
is a "precept which, though easy enough to understand, is rarely practised, and that is why the
poison of hatred spreads in the world." MOHANDIS K. GANDHI AUTOBIOGRAPHY: THE STORY
OF My EXPERIMENTS WITH TRUTH 242 (1983). Similarly, Martin Luther King consistently
preached throughout his life and works that sin and sinner should be separated. See, e.g.,
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE TRUMPET OF CONSCIENCE 74 (1968). Martin Luther King
wrote:
I've seen too much hate to want to hate, myself, and I've seen hate on the
faces of too many sheriffs, too many white citizens' councilors, and too
many Klansmen of the South to want to hate, myself, and every time I see
2003] TOLERANCE AS UNDERSTANDING 29
distinction, however, between a liberal decoupling and empathetic
decoupling. Liberal decoupling is generally a dispassionate
decoupling based on concerns for human autonomy. 60 However, with
empathetic decoupling, sin is separated from the sinner out of
understanding for the sinner.' 6' Gandhi's political and moral
conception of individuality and crime is useful in understanding this
difference. 162  In line with Buddhism and Hinduism, and contrary to
much of liberal thought, Gandhi relies on the empirical claim that
individual substantive differences may be transcended by devaluing
the very foundational nature of "individuality," "other-ness," or even
"moral conviction."' 163
Like empathetic reasoning, compassion should be an integral
component of any theory of tolerance based on understanding., 64
it, I say to myself, hate is too great a burden to bear. Somehow we must
be able to stand up before our most bitter opponents and say: 'We shall
match your capacity to inflict suffering by our capacity to endure
suffering. We will meet your physical force with soul force. Do to us
what you will and we will still love you.'
Id.
160. Mill advocates a liberal form of decoupling when he writes:
If he displeases us, we may express our distaste, and we may stand aloof
from a person as well as from a thing that displeases us; but we shall not
therefore feel called on to make his life uncomfortable. We shall reflect
that he already bears, or will bear, the whole penalty of his error; if he
spoils his life by mismanagement, we shall not, for that reason, desire to
spoil it still further ....
MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 2, at 91.
161. Id.
162. Gandhi's theory of non-violent resistance and truth-searching, satyagraha, requires
its followers to refrain from hating others, even those that steal or kill. The cornerstone of
Gandhi's practice of satyagraha is ahimsa, which means a loving, non-violent attitude towards
others, including those that have committed wrongs. MOHANDIS K. GANDHI, SATYAGRAHA
(1951). He explains how to transform our understanding of thieves:
[Ilt is better to endure the thieves than to punish them. The forbearance
may even bring them to their senses. By enduring them we realize that
thieves are not different from ourselves, they are our brethren, our friends,
and may not be punished. But whilst we may bear with the thieves, we
may not endure the infliction. That would only induce cowardice. So we
realize a further duty. Since we regard the thieves as our kith and kin,
they must be made to realize the kinship. And so we must take pains to
devise ways and means of winning them over. This is the path of ahimsa.
It may entail continuous suffering and the cultivating of endless patience.
Given these two conditions, the thief is bound in the end to turn away
from his evil ways. Thus step by step we learn how to make friends with
all the world; we realize the greatness of God -- of Truth.
Id. at41.
163. See sources cited supra notes 29, 48.
164. The notion of compassion developed here is based on similar sources as that of
empathetic reasoning -- legal, religious, moral and political understandings of tolerance. See
MARGINS [VOL. 3:1
Compassion is the ability to experience the hardship of others, to
commiserate with their suffering, and to show them sympathy without
dogmatism or pity.' 6 5 Tolerance should not be conceptualized as the
negative act of restraining our disapproval. 166 It should be conceived
as the affirmative act of reaching out to others, even those who are
perceived as immoral, to show them that society is concerned with
their well-being. 167 Compassion requires individuals to extend beyond
self-regard. 168  Some political theorists argue that compassion is
lacking in American political theory and American society more
generally. 1  They argue that American political theory should be
supra note 157.
165. Compassion is defined as "sorrow for the sufferings or trouble of another or others,
accompanied by an urge to help; deep sympathy; pity." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE
DICTIONARY 284 (3d ed. 1996). With the exception of common and dictionary descriptions of
compassion as "pity," these conventional understandings of compassion are similar to the
notion of compassion described herein.
166. The Bhagavad Gita states, "When a person responds to the joys and sorrows of
others as if they were his [or her] own, he [or she] has attained the highest state of spiritual
union." Gita 6:32. This is the central idea underlying compassion. Contrary to the liberal
claim that autonomy makes humans moral creatures, tolerance as understanding claims that
compassion is the bedrock of human morality.
167. Id.
168. A compassionate society is not centrally concerned with law, order and defense, but
concerned with providing for others and satisfying their basic needs. See Schwarzenbach,
Comm unitarianism, supra note 152, at 564 ("[w]hen I hear of a child abused next door, the
death of a loved one, or of a peoples' rights being systematically violated ... I am (or at least
should be) altered.").
A similar basis for a state-centered compassion is Justice Blackmun's dissent in
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). In that case, the Court had to decide whether a child, Joshua, and
his mother could bring a civil rights action against a government actor, Winnebago County's
Child Services, for failing to come to the aid of the Joshua, who endured repeated beatings at
the hands of his father, and as a result, suffered severe brain trauma. Winnebago County's
Child Services knew that the father was beating the child. In dissent, Justice Blackmun wrote:
Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible, bullying,
cowardly, and intemperate father, and abandoned by [the State] who
placed him in a dangerous predicament and who knew or learned what
was going on, and yet did essentially nothing except, as the Court
revealingly observes, "dutifully recorded these incidents in [their] files."
It is a sad commentary upon American life, and constitutional principles --
so full of late of patriotic fervor and proud proclamations about "liberty
and justice for all" -- that this child, Joshua DeShaney, now is assigned to
live out the remainder of his life profoundly retarded.
Id. at 213 (internal citations omitted).
169. See, e.g., Schwarzenbach, Communitarianism, supra note 152.
Schwarzenbach writes:
My own view is that if we are to think deeply about community
(about what it is that holds a just society together), we can no
longer overlook the important communal activities which women
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redefined according to certain feminist principles advocating
compassion. 170  The obligation to be compassionate requires that
individuals devalue the apparent discreetness of others' suffering.171
Sacrifice should also be considered a core component of
tolerance as understanding. Sacrifice is best expressed as the
foregoing of some valued thing for the sake of something of greater
value. 172 The foregoing of some valued thing, according to tolerance
as understanding, is individualized wants.' 73 The greater value is the
virtue derived from understanding, empathizing, and caring for others.
The religious notion that individuals are not solitary entities, but parts
of God, suggests that sacrificing for "another" is not truly a sacrifice in
the way this word is ordinarily used. 174  The sacrifice here is for a
have traditionally performed within the private sphere, for
instance, interpreting and responding to the concrete needs of
others, an activity that goes far toward binding people to one
another.
Id. at 563.
170. Id.
171. Ruth Colker provides an account of the "self," which she calls the "authentic self,"
which diverges dramatically from liberal conceptions of the self, especially the Millian or
rugged individualist self. See Colker, Feminism, supra note 47. The authentic self relies on
the idea that distinctions between individuals are illusory, and to the extent these distinctions
are exaggerated, normatively undesirable. The authentic self also relies on the idea that the
self is always moving towards its aspirations, the highest of which, is love. The
compassionate self is developed through "meditation (communication with our self) and
dialogue (communication with others)." Id. at 1020.
Anthony Cook similarly develops the idea that compassion requires a devaluing of the very
notion of selfhood:
Through the spirit of love we should meet the oppressed where they are,
with all their richness, diversity, hopes, and fears. In the complicated
matrix of that interaction, something remarkable, even mystical, often
happens. We experience the other not as other, but as self. Their
possibilities and limits become our own as we struggle together to find a
common way. A proper spirit of love is crucial, for the application of the
letter of love depends on a proper spirit. Without it, our applications will
ossify, turn oppressive and self-serving, and defeat the very concerns that
love is sworn to uphold.
Cook, Value of Love, supra note 134, at 1516.
172. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1180 (3d ed. 1996).
173. Id.
174. If this argument is extended to its natural conclusion, then sacrifice would require
that we sometimes forego valued things, such as our opinions about the immorality of a certain
person's actions, so that we may have the opportunity to interact with that person, which
might bring about an even greater value (communion) than our right to disapprove of his
conduct. In this vein, Anthony Cook writes that we sacrifice our individual wants for others
because this devaluation of self, and prioritization of communion, gives humanity higher
meaning. He writes:
The will of God is that we love [God] fully and love our neighbor as
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higher morality, which both individuals in the sacrifice share. For
example, a nursing mother who shares her milk with her child, or
another child, is not merely exchanging material wants, but also
transcending her individuality in an effort to realize a higher moral
relationship. She wants to bond with the child. This notion of
sacrifice occurs when individuals exchange material and emotional
wants, while simultaneously trying to bond with each other for a
greater qualitative good.
175
Forgiveness, the fourth obligation to be discussed, is a state of
mind in which one person desires to absolve another of some
subjective wrong.176 Religious conceptions of forgiveness,
particularly the "turn the other cheek" philosophy from Christ's
Sermon on the Mount, suggest that we should be willing to weather
the injustice of others, because we see justice and goodness in them
and acknowledge our own faults.' 77 Subsumed within this concept of
forgiveness is the idea that when someone wrongs us, they too are
wronged. 178 They may feel guilt over their action, remorse, or the pain
ourself. Thus, the will of God is that we consume ourselves at every level
of existence with a love of God that transforms our self-love into a
liberating love for others. Sin, then, is selfishness, a love for self that
draws us out of communion with God and humanity.
Cook, Value of Love, supra note 134, at 1480-81.
175. Id.
176. The notion of forgiveness I rely on here is drawn from religious sources. See
sources cited supra notes 88-89, 91, 97, 103. For example, on being crucified, Luke tells us
that Jesus said, "[God], forgive them; for they know not what they do." Luke 23:34. In a less
dramatic passage, the Book of Luke provides: "Be ye therefore merciful as your [God] also is
merciful. Judge not, and ye shall not be judged: condemn not, and ye shall not be condemned:
forgive, and ye shall be forgiven." Luke 6:36-37. See also Dhammapada 115 (explaining the
need for forgiveness).
Martin Luther King's writings and life work demonstrate a marked commitment to
Christian forgiveness. For example, even after being wrongly imprisoned after a civil rights
march, Martin Luther King's Letter from Birmingham Jail stresses the importance of forgiving
racists. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., I HAVE A DREAM: WRITINGS AND SPEECHES THAT CHANGED
THE WORLD, 84-100 (James M. Washington ed., Harper Collins 1992) (1986). His letter
speaks eloquently of the frustrations living day in and day out in a racist society; yet the Letter
from Birmingham Jail concludes with a monument to forgiveness, Christ's "love your
enemies" speech. Id. Equally as pointed was that after King's house was bombed on the
anniversary of the death of Gandhi, King convinced an angry crowd not to seek vengeance,
but rather to forgive. JAMES A. COLAIACO, MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.: APOSTLE OF MILITANT
NONVIOLENCE 13 (St. Martin's Press 1993) (1988).
177. See sources cited supra notes 88-89, 91, 97, 103, 176.
178. See Gandhi's discussion of why we should forgive the "sinner," supra note 104. See
also THICH NHAT HAHN, LOVE IN ACTION 76-77 (1993) (arguing that we need to replace the
idea of "enemy" with the notion that the immoral person is someone who is suffering a great
deal and who needs our compassion and forgiveness).
Martin Luther King, building on the "love your enemies" norm, promotes a similar
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that results when one believes there are no viable prospects for
redemption. 179  By practicing forgiveness, individuals are taught to
recognize that they are often motivated by ill-conceived wants and
desires, and that they themselves are often the creators of injustice. 80
Finally, like forgiveness, humility is based on the concept that
human beings are fallible and ill-equipped to realize truth.' 8'
Humility, which embraces both intellectual and moral modesty, is a
necessary component of true understanding. 82 It is important to note
here that intellectual and moral humility is not the same as relativism,
nihilism, or skepticism.' 83 As the political works of Mahatma Gandhi
conception of forgiveness:
[T]he Christian virtues of love, mercy and forgiveness should stand at the
center of our lives .... This love might well be the salvation of our
civilization .... Not through violence; not through hate; no, not even
through boycotts; but through love. It is true that as we struggle for
freedom in America we will have to boycott at times. But we must
remember as we boycott that a boycott is not an end within itself; it is
merely a means to awaken a sense of shame within the oppressor and
challenge his false sense of superiority. But the end is reconciliation, the
end is redemption; the end is the creation of the beloved community. It is
this type of spirit and this type of love that transform opposers into friends.
MARTIN LUTHER KING, I HAVE A DREAM: WRITINGS AND SPEECHES THAT CHANGED THE
WORLD 21-22 (James Washington ed., 1992) (1986).
179. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
181. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 658 (3d ed. 1996) ("the state or
quality of being humble; absence of pride or self-assertion."). There is a long tradition in
Western philosophy concerning humanity's inability to realize truth. See, e.g., RICHARD H.
POPKIN, THE HISTORY OF SKEPTICISM FROM ERASMUS TO SPINOZA (1979) (discussing the
history of skepticism).
182. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. Mahatma Gandhi's, and others'
conception of "sin" is helpful. Id. Under Satyagraha, punishment of others, solely for the
sake of punishment alone, is generally impermissible because humans are not capable of
knowing absolute truth, and thus, are not competent to punish. MOHANDAS K. GANDHI,
SATYAGRAHA 3 (1951).
Buddhism's notion of humility towards moral claims stems from its view that
individuals are conceptions -- ever-changing relational constructs. Ross, BUDDHISM: A WAY
OF LIFE AND THOUGHT, supra note 28, at 28 ("... in truth there is no definite 'I' existing by
itself, independent of the ever shifting relation among psychic and physical forces.").
Individuals and their knowledge are in constant flux. Id. Perceptions of morality, for
example, are developing and changing. When we combine the idea that "individuality" is a
construct with the idea that self-awareness and knowledge are constantly changing, we see that
humility about moral claims is essential. Id.
183. In this regard, Karl Popper's artful distinction between what he calls fallibilism,
which accepts truth, and relativism, which does not, is instructive:
To answer and to reject relativism is, in my opinion, of the greatest
importance. And it is quite simple. Human fallibility means that we all
may err, and that we must not rely on what appears to us as true, or as
morally right, because it may not be true, or morally right. But this
implies that there is such a thing as truth, and that there are actions that are
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and much of Buddhist thought suggests, humility is a way to challenge
the certitude of our own views, so that we can be open to other
views. 184
C. Tolerance: A Means or an End?
As the previous discussion suggests, an important distinction
between liberal tolerance and tolerance as understanding is that
liberalism treats tolerance as a means whereas tolerance as
understanding treats it as an ends.' 85 Millian liberals treat tolerance as
a means for advancing social progress, whereas Kantian liberals treat
tolerance as a means for fostering human autonomy and freedom.
186
Unlike these two liberal approaches, tolerance as understanding
claims that tolerance, and the obligations of empathy and compassion,
are noble ends in themselves.
In making such a claim, it is important to consider whether
individuals can in fact be motivated to act in a manner where empathy
and compassion are their main obligations, and whether individuals
should act in this manner. 87  The empirical component of this
question, whether individuals can practice tolerance as understanding,
is a difficult question.' First, it must be accepted that as a matter of
historical record, tolerance as understanding has rarely been practiced
beyond the social structure of the nuclear family, extended family and
morally right, or very nearly so. Fallibilism certainly implies that truth
and goodness are often hard to come by, and that we should always be
prepared to find that we have made a mistake. On the other hand,
fallibilism implies that we can get nearer to the truth, or to a good society.
Now we certainly cannot avoid acting, or taking sides; for even inaction is
an action, and amounts to taking sides. What all this teaches us is that we
must never stop our critical -- a highly critical -- search for truth, always
trying to learn from those who hold a different view. We must try to listen
to others, and to learn from others, and especially from our opponents, if
we seriously wish to get nearer to the truth, or to discover the best kind of
action within our reach. And precisely for this reason, we must reject
relativism.
KARL POPPER, Toleration and Intellectual Responsibility, in ON TOLERATION, supra note
93, at 25-26.
184. See supra notes 162, 182 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 47-130 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 88-129 and accompanying text.
187. Critics of tolerance as understanding would certainly criticize it on the grounds that
it is "utopian." See, e.g., THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY (1991) (arguing that the
problem with utopian theories is that human beings cannot be motivated to live according to
them).
188. Seesupra note 28.
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close friends. But, the central issue is not whether humanity has ever
practiced tolerance as understanding, but rather, whether individuals
are capable of practicing such a form of tolerance.
Although this question cannot be definitively answered, the
fact that many individuals have successfully practiced variants of
tolerance as understanding, such as Mahatma Gandhi and Martin
Luther King, demonstrates that it is possible for individuals to do so.89
Moreover, there are countless examples of lesser-known religious and
charitable individuals who regularly practice variations of tolerance as
understanding. Finally, the fact that individuals do practice forms of
tolerance as understanding among their nuclear and extended families,
as well as close friends, suggests that if the perception of who
constitutes "family" and "friends" moves beyond these groups,
tolerance as understanding may be practiced on a much wider scale.
It is important to recognize that most Americans analyze the
prospects of using tolerance as understanding as an organizing
principle through the prism of our liberal traditions and cultures.
190
We attempt to fit tolerance as understanding into an existing liberal
framework of social conventions, institutions, and incentives.1 91 There
is also the related problem that we often tend to conflate our normative
view of human nature as autonomous creatures with the empirical
claim that people are in fact most easily motivated by individual
concerns. 2  Our present political culture conflates what our
189. This section has pointed to a number of examples of individuals advocating and
practicing such forms of tolerance. This anecdotal evidence, at a minimum, supports the
possibility of humans practicing tolerance as understanding. In addition to King and
Gandhi's writings and actions, Thich Nhat Hahn's life illustrates the possibilities of tolerance
as understanding. See THICH NHAT HAHN, LIVING BUDDHA, LIVING CHRIST (1995). For
example, during the Vietnam War, one of Thich Nhat Hahn's disciples was spit on by an
American soldier. There was no reason for the soldier to spit on this non-violent monk other
than the racism and hatred that war breeds. The young monk wanted to quit the monastery in
order to join the National Liberation Front to defend his country against such hatred and
violence. Through his meditations on compassion and forgiveness, Thich Nhat Hanh was able
to see the American soldier as a victim of war in the same way that he saw his disciple as a
victim of the war. He then led his disciple through similar meditations on understanding.
Eventually, Thich Nhat Hahn succeeded in teaching his disciple to see the young American
soldier as a product of the war, and ultimately, succeeded in persuading his disciple to remain
a monk. Id.
190. See sources cited supra notes 6, 65.
191. See sources cited supra notes 6, 65.
192. Anthony Cook recognizes this in writing about Locke:
Why should Locke's characterization of humans as universally rational
appropriators of private property be accepted? Critics have contended that
Locke is reading into human nature the attributes ... he most wanted to
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motivations can be with what we want them to be.193. Thus, it is
difficult to divorce the normative liberal aspirations of the society from
the empirical claims about how individuals in that society can be
motivated to act.' 94 Whether individuals can be sufficiently inculcated
with the values underlying tolerance as understanding, and whether
social incentives may be put in place to foster these values cannot be
answered with any reasonable degree of certainty. But it must be
recognized that historically, many individuals have been motivated to
act according to a theory of tolerance based on understanding and that
such a theory, which conceptualizes tolerance as a paramount end of
individual moral behavior, is conceptually viable.
1II. UNDERSTANDING IN CONSTITUTIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
This section of the article addresses the question of whether
tolerance as understanding can serve as an empirically and
normatively sound principle for resolving cases, primarily those
involving issues of tolerance and civil rights. In order to highlight the
significant differences between liberal tolerance and tolerance as
understanding, a highly stylized account of each will again be
presented. As has been suggested throughout, autonomy and
understanding are assumed to be the paramount virtues of each of the
respective paradigms. 95  Thus, in deciding cases, legal institutions
would be guided by these paramount virtues. A liberal jurisprudence
would more strongly emphasize the rights of individuals and the value
of individuals autonomously pursuing their own conception of the
good, whereas a jurisprudence promoting understanding would more
strongly emphasize mutual obligations that individuals have and the
value of caring for others. 196 Based on these core ideas, this article
extol and justify. Thus, Locke's rational appropriator of private property
is merely an abstraction from his own emerging market society ....
Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REv. 985-99 (1990) (internal citations omitted)
[hereinafter, Cook, Reconstructive Theology]. See also JoHN DEWEY, FREEDOM AND CULTURE
21 (1939) ("The idea that human nature is inherently and exclusively individual is itself a
product of a cultural individualistic movement. The idea that the mind and consciousness are
intrinsically individual did not even occur to any one for much the greater part of human
history.").
193. See supra note 192.
194. See supra note 192.
195. See supra notes 47-130 and accompanying text.
196. Although we want to exercise caution in categorizing complex normative moral and
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suggests some principles of dispute resolution based on tolerance as
understanding and compares them with their liberal counterparts.
The table below compares some adjudicative principles derived
from norms of understanding with principles derived from liberalism.
These core ideas are not intended to be exhaustive, but rather
illustrative of some core concepts in possible institutional legal
theories based on understanding.
TABLE: NORMS OF ADJUDICATION'97
Tolerance as Understanding Liberal Tolerance
1. Understanding 1. Autonomy and Freedom
2. Emphasis on Mutual Obligations 2. Emphasis on Individual Rights
3. Affirmative Norms a. empathetic 3. Negative Norms a. right to judge
reasoning other's morality
b. compassion b. restraint
towards others
c. sacrifice c. individual
autonomy
d. forgiveness d. individual
responsibility
e. humility e. thick-skinned
notion of own
good
From these general principles, some assumptions may be made
about how legal institutions might approach substantive issues under
tolerance as understanding, as compared with liberalism. First, a
jurisprudence based on tolerance as understanding would likely
emphasize the empathetic narratives of individuals over formal legal
jurisprudential theories, we can more or less safely say that certain jurisprudential concepts
and theories are more closely aligned with the liberal camp and some are more closely aligned
with norms of understanding. Compare,for example, DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS supra note 2,
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 2, RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, and
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 2, with Cook, Value of Love, supra note 134,
Colker, Feminism, supra note 47, Schwarzenbach, Communitarianism, supra note 152, and
PERRY, LOVE AND POWER, supra note 124.
197. The norms of adjudication are drawn from the previous two sections and are
essentially a composite of the arguments put forth therein.
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rights. 198  Abstract individual rights, neutrality, formalism, and
textualism would be secondary to specific narratives of individuals and
groups requiring empathy and compassion. The values served by a
seemingly neutral and formalized set of legal rules, which often serve
to foster the stability of status quo norms, would be weighed against
specific concerns of compassion and empathy. 199  Second, a
jurisprudence based on tolerance as understanding might emphasize
the normative idea that individuals should not be conceptualized as
being primarily autonomous. 20 In other words, to the extent
practicable, legal institutions should emphasize the interconnectedness
198. Empathy and compassion, as well as the empirical argument that "otherness" and
"individuality" are wrongly overemphasized, require individuals to look deeply into the other
party's actions, in a way that formalisms generally do not permit. See supra notes 166-82,
189. As legal scholar Lynne Henderson notes:
Much in the nature of legality can block empathic understanding. The
structures and beliefs about law that constitute 'legality' may allow legal
decisionmakers to be relatively unreflective about their choice to ignore
empathic phenomena. A value of legality in American culture is that the
Rule of Law opposes some Hobbesian free-for-all. The Rule of Law is the
reification of rules governing rights and duties to which we pay homage:
thus, this is a 'government of laws, not men'; the Rule of Law transcends
humans and is superior to them.
Henderson, supra note 152, at 1587 (internal citation omitted). See also DERRICK BELL,
FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL 101-04 (1992) (explaining how legal formalisms tend to
mask the real social inequalities and injustices that effect individuals).
199. See supra note 198.
200. See supra notes 166-82, 189. As Anthony Cook notes:
The individual is not, by nature, an autonomous and acquisitive being
desiring to dominate others and appropriate property. Rather, her
alienation and loneliness are socially produced. Individuals long for a
genuine connection with others, a mutual acknowledgment of their
humanity and need for empowerment. However, socially imposed roles
temper their desires for connection with fears of rejection. The regime of
liberal rights establishes many of these roles through the distribution of
abstract rights and duties that distance us from ourselves and others whom
we long to experience in more meaningful ways than our present social
existence permits ....
We are lonely because our relationships with each other are
distorted by these [liberal] abstractions, and thus the potential for genuine
connection is always limited by the socially contrived roles we adopt.
Landlord/tenant, employer/laborer, professor/student, bank
teller/customer, and judge/lawyer are all roles that distance us, diminish
our intersubjectivity, and decrease the likelihood of a sustained sense of
community. The liberal state, however, provides us with an alternative
community that really is no community at all. To mediate the threat posed
by others to ourselves, the state fosters an illusion of a community
consisting of rights-bearing citizens said to be equal before the law and
thus members of a community of equals.
Cook, Reconstructive Theology, supra note 192, at 1007-08 (internal citations omitted).
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between disputing or antagonistic individuals, and highlight common
interests. 2°  And third, a jurisprudence based on understanding might
emphasize the idea that legal causality cannot generally be reduced to
autonomous individual actions and autonomous morality.20 2  Put
simply, an individual's social circumstances may outweigh his
individual culpability and responsibility. Humility would require that
legal institutions remain highly skeptical about attributing moral
culpability to single individuals or single 
interests in society.
203
The Norms of Adjudication and the three corollary principles
discussed above will be used to compare how the two paradigms might
address four controversial constitutional issues, the death penalty, gay
rights, hate speech, and minority religious freedom. Each of these four
constitutional issues provides a different lesson about liberalism and
tolerance as understanding. Hate speech, gay rights, and minority
religious freedom are traditional tolerance or civil rights issues, and
each has been selected because it demonstrates important conceptual
similarities and differences between the two paradigms.204 The death
penalty, which is generally not thought of as a classic example of
tolerance, was selected for two reasons. First, from the theoretical
standpoint of tolerance as understanding, the death penalty is in fact
an issue concerning tolerance.20 5  The requirements of tolerance,
empathy, compassion and humility, are central to the issue of whether
an individual should receive the death penalty.20 6 Second, the death
penalty debate serves as a useful theoretical vehicle for highlighting
significant differences between core liberal jurisprudential themes and
core themes based on tolerance as understanding.
20 7
A. Death Penalty
The central concern in this section is to distinguish between
tolerance as understanding's emphasis on empathetic reasoning,
compassion, forgiveness, and humility, and liberalism's emphasis on
autonomous moral action and individual culpability. These two
different emphases are best thought of as legal presumptions or default
201. Id.
202. Again, the Buddhist and Hindu challenge to "otherness" and "individuality"
illustrates this principle. See supra notes 166-82, 189 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 166-82, 189 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 47-130 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 137-82 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 137-82 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 47-130 and accompanying text.
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positions. The liberal presumption is that individuals are autonomous,
or at least should be conceptualized as such, and that their actions are
the products of an autonomous decision-making process and
autonomous morality.20 8  In contrast, tolerance as understanding
begins with a different legal presumption -- that individuals are often
not individually responsible for illegal or immoral conduct, and that
social circumstances often play a determining role in such conduct. At
a minimum, tolerance as understanding makes the normative claim
that the causes of immorality and illegal conduct should not be
conceptualized as primarily resulting from individual decision-making.
To crudely illustrate the different legal presumptions, the
following example of racism will be used. Assume that a sixteen-year-
old child who has grown up in a highly racist family is more likely to
be racist than another sixteen-year-old who grew up in a family which
taught that racism was wrong. If the first child was sufficiently
inculcated with racist values from birth to young adulthood, that child
would likely be racist. However, assuming that this child acted on
these indoctrinated beliefs, it would be a stretch to argue that his racist
actions are primarily reducible to his own culpability. Nevertheless, as
a general proposition, a liberal legal system would hold the child
responsible for any actions taken as a result of his racism. 209 In fact, a
liberal legal system would generally regard the first and second child
as having similar backgrounds. Each child would be judged against
some abstract standard of behavior and subsequently held responsible
for his actions.
210
However, a jurisprudence based on tolerance as understanding
might conceptualize the moral culpability of the children in a different
manner. Assume further that the first child is able to make gains in
overcoming his racist background, whereas the second child becomes
more racist over time. The first child's progress, in fact, equals the
decline in the second child's views; but the first child's overall
attitudes are still more racist. Because of this progress, the first child
refuses to join a violent gang of racist skinheads and instead joins a
separatist group that promotes peaceful coexistence between blacks
and whites. Meanwhile, the second child refuses to join this separatist
group, instead joining a somewhat less racist group. Is the first child
208. See supra notes 2-6, 37, 43-47 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., Stanford v. Ky., 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484
(1990). See also Ernest van den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99 HARv. L.
REV. 1662 (1986).
210. See sources cited supra note 209.
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who joined the more racist group, more blameworthy than the second
child? Although there may be pragmatic reasons for suggesting that
the first child is more worthy of censure, for example, deterring
racism, a jurisprudence based on norms of understanding would
strongly consider the first child, who overcame more than the second
child, to be less blameworthy.
This example suggests an important conceptual distinction
between the two jurisprudences. Whereas liberal legal norms,
particularly norms relating to criminal behavior, are based on
retribution for individual action, norms based on understanding are
deeply skeptical of retribution, and thus are firmly grounded in
deterrence alone.2 1 Holding a teenager culpable because he or she
was inculcated with racist values from birth to young adulthood makes
little sense, unless one is doing so to deter similar conduct from that
child or others. Without the pragmatic component of deterrence, the
first child should be considered less blameworthy than the second. If
the first and second child's social circumstances were controlled, in
that they had similar exposure to non-racist attitudes, the first child
would be the less racist.
This general proposition concerning individual culpability
would also guide a death penalty jurisprudence based on tolerance as
understanding. The central point of this discussion is that a
jurisprudence based on tolerance as understanding would begin with
the presumption that rarely, if at all, are people so independently
culpable as to bear the burden of death, especially given an intellectual
and moral humility about putting one to death.
The case of Stanford v. Kentucky demonstrates the main
difference between tolerance as understanding and liberalism. 212 In
Stanford, Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion.213 The Court held
that it was not cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment to impose the death penalty on sixteen-year-old
offenders. 214  Sixteen-year-old Heath Wilkins brutally murdered
Nancy Allen.215 Allen was a twenty-six-year old mother of two who
was working behind the sales counter of the convenience store that she
211. See, e.g., van den Haag, supra note 209 (examining justifications for the death
penalty).
212. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 366.
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216and her husband owned. 6 There can be no dispute that Nancy Allen
and her family suffered an enormous tragedy. Any desirable theory of
jurisprudence would have to demonstrate a foremost empathy for such
suffering. But the requirement of empathy, and in particular
decoupling, should also extend to Heath Wilkins. 21 7  A theory of
jurisprudence based on tolerance as understanding, would not defend
Wilkins' actions, but would empathetically and compassionately
examine the life of the troubled sixteen-year-old in assessing
blameworthiness.218 In the case of Heath Wilkins, his life was beyond
tragic. He "had been in and out of juvenile facilities since the age of
eight for various acts of burglary, theft, and arson, had attempted to
kill his mother by putting insecticide into Tylenol capsules, and had
killed several animals in his neighborhood., 21 9 The report of the state-
appointed psychiatrist, which is heavily relied upon by the empathetic
dissent of Justice Brennan, gives a detailed narrative of Heath Wilkins'
life, and provides a vivid account of the circumstances in his life that
contributed to his crime.
220
216. Id. Justice Scalia recounted the details of this senseless murder:
The record reflects that Wilkins' plan was to rob the store and murder
'whoever was behind the counter' because 'a dead person can't talk.'
While Wilkins' accomplice, Patrick Stevens, held Allen, Wilkins stabbed
her, causing her to fall to the floor. When Stevens had trouble operating
the cash register, Allen spoke up to assist him, leading Wilkins to stab her
three more times in her chest. Two of these wounds penetrated the
victim's heart. When Allen began to beg for her life, Wilkins stabbed her
four more times in the neck, opening her carotid artery. After helping
themselves to liquor, cigarettes, rolling papers, and approximately $450 in
cash and checks, Wilkins and Stevens left Allen to die on the floor.
Id.
217. See supra notes 164-68. It is also worth pointing out how difficult, yet possible,
empathy for those who commit immoral acts is. An example of the difficulty yet promise of
decoupling is the empathy a relative of a child molester might feel towards the molester. I can
think of few better examples of intolerance in America than the way in which Americans treat
child molesters and criminals in general. The act of child molestation is so horrific, so alien to
our own conceptions of morality, that most Americans are unable to show the slightest degree
of understanding with respect to the perpetrators. Yet, often, a loving relative of a child
molester may go to great extremes to sympathize with the molester, even though the relative
thinks the act itself abhorrent. The relatives of molesters who show compassion are no less
inclined than the rest of us to find molestation repugnant. Nevertheless, their love allows them
to separate the actions from the individual.
218. Seesupra notes 137-82.
219. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 367.
220. The psychiatrist's report is a lengthy account of the miserable childhood of Heath
Wilkins. This extended narrative, from which I can only provide a small section, provides
compelling evidence of the social circumstances playing on Wilkins' culpability. The reports
states, in part:
Mr. Wilkins . . .was raised in a rather poor socioeconomic environment
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The majority argued that the age and life circumstances of
Heath Wilkins could not overcome the liberal presumption that
Wilkins was acting autonomously and was responsible for his
221
actions. In large measure, the Justices in this case could not see
Wilkins' relative lack of culpability because of their fidelity to liberal
legal principles. Again, borrowing from Hobbesian "liberal physics,"
the individual, "at rest" and in his "natural state," has few if any forces
impinging upon his individual conscience. 2  Therefore, the individual
is solely responsible for the development and use of that conscience.223
The dissent in Stanford, however, adopted a position more
closely aligned with a jurisprudence based on norms of
understanding. 224  Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Blackmun,
Marshall, and Stevens, argued that juveniles on death row, like Heath
Wilkins, are most often the product of social forces well beyond their
control.225  This general evidence of the circumstances underlying
[and] reportedly had [sic] extremely chaotic upbringing during his
childhood. He was physically abused by his mother, sometimes the
beatings would last for two hours .... Mr. Wilkins indicated that his
mother's boyfriend had a quick temper and that he hated him. He also
started disliking his mother, not only because she punished [him], but also
because she stood up for her boyfriend who was unkind towards [him].
He then decided to poison his mother and boyfriend by placing rat poison
in Tylenol capsules. They were informed by his brother about the
situation. They secretly emptied the capsules and made him eat them. He
was afraid of death and attempted vomiting by placing [his] finger down
his throat. Then he ended up getting a beating from his mother and
boyfriend .... Records from Butterfield ... indicated that Mr. Wilkins'
natural father was committed to a mental institution in Arkansas, and there
was considerable amount of physical abuse that existed in the family ....
Mr. Wilkins' brother was diagnosed to be suffering from schizophrenia
when he was admitted along with Mr. Wilkins in 1982 at Crittenton
Center.
Id. at 402 n. 14.
221. Id. at402.
222. See supra notes 30-34, 52-53 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 30-34, 52-53 and accompanying text.
224. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 383.
225. In arguing against the constitutionality of the death penalty for juveniles, Justice
Brennan relied on evidence suggesting that juveniles who commit crimes are frequently are
product of severe psychological trauma:
Adolescents on death row appear typically to have a battery of
psychological, emotional, and other problems going to their likely
capacity for judgment and level of blameworthiness. A recent diagnostic
evaluation of all 14 juveniles on death rows in four States is instructive.
Seven of the adolescents sentenced to die were psychotic when evaluated,
or had been so diagnosed in earlier childhood; four others had histories
consistent with diagnoses of severe mood disorders; and the remaining
three experienced periodic paranoid episodes, during which they would
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death-row adolescents, coupled with the specific evidence of Wilkins'
life, failed to persuade the majority.226 The evidence could not
overcome the presumption that individuals should be considered
autonomous beings because liberalism requires individuals to express
their individual character.227
Autonomy's dominance over understanding is no more evident
than in the case of Saffle v. Parks.228 In that case, the Supreme Court
decided whether a trial judge could instruct a jury not to consider
sympathy in determining whether a convicted criminal should receive
the death penalty. 229 In Saffle, the state trial court judge instructed the
jury: "you must avoid any influence of sympathy, sentiment, passion,
prejudice, or other arbitrary factor when imposing sentence. ' 23° The
Supreme Court, over a strong dissent, held that an anti-sympathy
instruction was permissible.231 The pervasive nature of this liberal
default position is demonstrated by the fact that of the six courts that
heard this case, only one determined that there may be circumstances
in which a jury could show sympathy towards a convict in a death
penalty proceeding. 232  Saffle v. Parks demonstrates that a liberal
jurisprudence is reluctant to empathetically view immoral actions in a
manner that mitigates individual culpability. 233
assault perceived enemies. Eight had suffered severe head injuries during
childhood, and nine suffered from neurological abnormalities.
Id. at 398 (internal citations omitted).
226. Id.
227. See supra notes 2-6, 37, 43-47 and accompanying text.
228. 494 U.S. 484 (1990).
229. Among other evidence presented, Parks' counsel put on evidence that Parks' father
was in a penitentiary during Parks' childhood; Parks became involved in crime at an early age;
and Parks had difficulty attending school, in part because of forced bussing. In his closing
remarks, Parks' counsel summed up Parks' disadvantaged childhood and asked the jury to
show "kindness" when considering Parks' circumstances. Id. at 486.
230. Id. at 487.
231. Id. at 486.
232. This issue of whether a trial court can instruct a jury not to engage in sympathy first
proceeded through two state courts (the trial court and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals), and then certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court. Thereafter,
pursuant to federal habeas corpus law, this issue proceeded through another four levels of
federal courts (the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit en banc, and finally, the United States
Supreme Court). Of the six different courts that addressed the issue of whether a trial court
can forbid a jury from engaging in sympathy, only one, the Tenth Circuit en banc, held that
such an instruction was impermissible. Most interestingly, the issue was not even whether
sympathy might, under some circumstances be a factor, but rather, whether a jury could be
prohibited under all circumstances from having sympathy enter the calculus of this life and
death decision. Saffle v. Parks, 925 F.2d 366, 367 (10th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
233. Until recently, the Supreme Court has demonstrated its fidelity to the liberal default
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It is important to clarify that a death penalty jurisprudence
based on norms of understanding would not argue that there is no role
for assessing individual blameworthiness in criminal sentencing.
2 3 4
First, deterrence of future crimes would require judges to make
distinctions between individuals and their. respective culpabilities.
235
For example, based on the need for individual and social deterrence
alone, a judge practicing tolerance as understanding would clearly
need to draw distinctions between premeditated murder and
manslaughter, the former requiring the harsher sentence. 236  And
second, there would be nothing in a jurisprudence based on tolerance
as understanding precluding the judge or jury from showing a greater
moral disapprobation for a particular act. Clearly, some crimes are
more heinous than others. Thus, a judge or jury could "hate the sin" of
murder more than the sin of manslaughter, so long as both are treated
with similar degrees of empathy and compassion. 238 It is important to
emphasize that not all criminals are equally non-culpable for their
crimes. Rather, a jurisprudence based on norms of understanding
presumes that rarely, if at all, are people so independently culpable as
to bear the burden of death.
position by adhering to the view that the execution of the mentally retarded is constitutionally
permissible. Prior to the Supreme Court's landmark decision last term in Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002), the Supreme Court held that it was not a violation of the Eighth
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment clause to execute mentally retarded individuals.
See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). In Penry, the Supreme Court was unwilling to
overturn the conviction of a man with an I.Q. between 50 and 60, who was the victim of
horrific child abuse. Raymond Bonner & Sara Rimer, Mentally Retarded Man Facing Texas
Execution Draws Wide Attention, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2000, at A34 (describing how Penry's
mother beat him, burned him, starved him, repeatedly threatened to cut off his genitals and
forced him to eat his own feces and drink his own urine).
In Penry, the Supreme Court held that the evidence of severely diminished mental
capacity, familial mental history and psychological childhood trauma was not enough to
overcome this liberal presumption of Penry's individual culpability. The majority opinion,
written by Justice O'Connor, held "I cannot conclude that all mentally retarded people of
Penry's ability -- by virtue of their mental retardation alone, and apart from any individualized
consideration of their personal responsibility -- inevitably lack the cognitive, volitional, and
moral capacity to act with the degree of culpability associated with the death penalty." Penry,
492 U.S. at 338.
In Atkins, however, the Supreme Court, following the lead of numerous state
legislatures that have abolished the death penalty for the mentally retarded, held that it is
unconstitutional to execute the mentally retarded. 536 U.S. 304.
234. See supra notes 60-67, 137-82 and accompanying text.
235. See generally Ernest van den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99 HARV.
L. REv. 1662 (1986) (examining justifications for the death penalty).
236. See supra notes 28, 47, 162 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 28, 47, 162 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
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B. Hate Speech
Hate speech cases present an even clearer example of the
different jurisprudential approaches.239 In general, liberal theories of
tolerance endorse a far-sweeping freedom of speech because such a
broad freedom fosters the liberal values of autonomy and freedom to
pursue one's own conception of the good.24 °  Perhaps the most
significant liberal justification for the freedom of speech is the
"marketplace of ideas" argument. 24' According to this argument, the
different conceptions of the good are to be debated through a fair and
neutral political process, protected by free speech norms.24 2  The
government, according to this rationale, should not judge these
different conceptions, but should remain neutral with respect to their
content, allowing the "marketplace of public opinion" to decide on the
243value of these various conceptions.  Liberals also defend freedom of
speech on the related ground that it is essential for political expression
and self-governance. 244 Politics is conceptualized as a town meeting,
where all political points of view may be heard and deliberated upon.
Based on this rationale, political forms of speech are generally
afforded more protection than other forms of speech, such as
pornography, commercial speech, and fighting words.
A good example of courts applying this liberal defense of free
speech, particularly hate speech, is in Skokie v. National Socialist
party of America.245  In 1977, the United States and Illinois Supreme
239. The issue we will explore is whether the First Amendment protects speech that is
primarily hateful in nature. The First Amendment states, "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I. Although the First Amendment has
become one of the cornerstones of American politics, and American political culture more
generally, it was not until the latter half of the twentieth century that the First Amendment was
given its robust modem meaning. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957)
(overturning convictions under the Smith Act).
240. There are numerous liberal arguments supporting free speech, many of which have
been touched on in Part I of this article. Mill's arguments, for example, were outlined supra
notes 88-112. See also LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
EXTREMIST SPEECH TN AMERICA (1986).
241. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing
competition in the marketplace of ideas is the best way to get to truth); MILL, ON LIBERTY,
supra note 2 (arguing that free speech will not necessarily lead to truth, but that social progress
is made through free speech); Meiklejohn, supra note 4 (arguing that free speech is necessary
component of political dialogue and democracy).
242. See supra note 241.
243. See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("... that the best test of truth
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market...").
244. Meiklejohn, supra note 5; JOHN HART ELY, DEMORACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
245. See 69 Ill. 2d 605 (1978). See also Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
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Courts had to decide whether the First Amendment protected the right
of a small group of Nazis to march down the streets of Skokie, a
village with a large Jewish population, including thousands of victims
of the Holocaust. 246  The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
brought a number of significant cases on behalf of the Nazis and won
every case.247 The Illinois Supreme Court, following both the
marketplace of ideas and self-governance rationales, accepted the
ACLU position:
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful
medicine in a society as diverse and populous as ours.
It is designed and intended to remove governmental
restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting
the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely
into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such
freedom will ultimately produce a more capable
citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that
no other approach would comport with the premise of
individual dignity and choice upon which our political
system rests.248
In the landmark case of R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul (1992), the
Supreme Court, in deciding how far the foregoing free speech
rationales should extend, struck down a St. Paul hate speech criminal
ordinance. 24 9 In R.A. V., a teenager, Robert A. Vicktora, was charged
with violating the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance for
allegedly burning a cross on the front lawn of a black family's
246. See Skokie, 69 Ill. 2d 605; Collin, 578 F.2d 1197. See also DAVID HAMLIN, THE
NAzI/SKOKIE: A CIVIL LIBERTIES BATTLE (1980). This Nazi group, the National Socialist Party
of America, was a disorganized collection of individuals, led by a most curious local figure,
Frank Collin. Frank Collin's motivations for choosing to march on a town where thousands of
Holocaust survivors lived may be characterized as quite odd. Id. Not only was Frank Collin
(born Frank Cohn) a Jew, his father was a survivor of the infamous Nazi concentration camp,
Dachau. Id. When Collin announced that he was going to march his group through Skokie,
many Jewish residents made clear their intention to harm Collin and his clan and asked the
Village to prohibit the march. In April of 1977, Skokie obtained an injunction prohibiting
Collin's group from marching. One month later, Skokie, in an attempt to solidify its anti-Nazi
position, passed three ordinances that were designed to make it difficult for a group such as
Collin's to get a permit to march. HAMLIN, THE NAZI/SKOKIE.
247. HAMLIN, THE NAzI/SKOKIE, supra note 246.
248. Skokie, 69 Ill. 2d at 613-15 (citing Whitney v. Cal., 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring)).
249. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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home. 25  The Supreme Court unanimously struck down this statute on
First Amendment grounds.25 1 Although there was a sharp concurrence
disagreeing with the majority's reasoning, the Justices agreed that the
statute was unconstitutional, because the statute regulated the content
of speech, as opposed to merely the time, place or manner of
252speech. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia began his opinion
by setting forth a well-established conceptual distinction in liberal
First Amendment jurisprudence, that content-based restrictions may be
divided into two forms of speech, high speech and low speech.253
High speech consists of political, artistic and religious forms of
expression and low speech consists of defamation, fighting words,
obscenity, and pornography.254 There is a heavy presumption that
content-based regulations will be invalid, except in cases involving
low speech.255 The reason for this, as suggested above, is that low
forms of speech are generally not associated with the two core values
underlying the First Amendment, the search for truth through the
marketplace of ideas, and self-governance.256 As the R.A. V. majority
noted, we have "permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a
few limited areas, which are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. 257
The Court in R.A. V. accepted the Minnesota Supreme Court's
conclusion that the St. Paul ordinance was a content-based regulation,
but one that covered only "fighting words" which was a form a "low
speech" and thus could be regulated.258 Nevertheless, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the specific ordinance was unconstitutional
250. The ordinance provided:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a
burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis
of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id. at 280 (citing St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, St. Paul Minn., Legis. Code §
292.02 (1990)).
251. Id. at 381-86.
252. Id. at 381.
253. Id. at 382-86.
254. Id.
255. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382-86.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 382-83 (citing Chaplinsky v. N.H., 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
258. Id. at 380-81.
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because it criminalized only certain types of invectives. 259  These
incentives included only those directed to specified disfavored topics,
like racism. 260 The majority made clear that the government may not
endorse specific viewpoints by making certain speech criminal.261 The
City of St. Paul, according to the majority, could not selectively
regulate only those fighting words that provoke violence on the basis
of race, color, creed, religion or gender. 262  The Court stated, "The
First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose special
prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored
,263subjects." According to the Court, the only permissible distinction
between types of fighting words are those based on the very reason
this category of speech is being proscribed.2 64 In other words, St. Paul
might have regulated only those words which were in fact most likely
to lead to "fighting"; that is, those words most threatening or
265
noxious.
Justice White, along with Justices O'Connor, Blackmun and
Stevens, concurred in the judgment, but strongly disagreed with the
majority's reasoning.266 Justice White wrote, "The case could easily
be decided within the contours of established First Amendment law by
259. Id. at 387-96.
260. Id.
261. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 387-96.
262. Id.
263. The Court further stated:
The dispositive question in this case, therefore, is whether content
discrimination is reasonably necessary to achieve St. Paul's compelling
interests; it plainly is not. An ordinance not limited to the favored topics,
for example, would have precisely the same beneficial effect. In fact the
only interest distinctively served by the content limitation is that of
displaying the city council's special hostility towards the particular biases
thus singled out. That is precisely what the First Amendment forbids.
The politicians of St. Paul are entitled to express that hostility -- but not
through the means of imposing unique limitations upon speakers who
(however benightedly) disagree.
Id. at 395-96 (internal citations omitted).
264. Id. at 388.
265. For example, in the context of pornography, the Court suggests that a regulation
may proscribe those forms of speech involving the most lascivious forms of pornography, as
lasciviousness is the basis for regulating this type of speech in the first instance, but not certain
types of pornography, like those with offensive political messages. Id. The Court justified its
reasoning on the ground that fighting words are proscribable, in the first instance, because the
manner in which the content is presented (for example, threatening or hostile) is not related to
the truth of the speech, an important value underlying the First Amendment. Moreover,
hostility in speech does not further the other significant First Amendment value discussed
earlier, self-governance. Id.
266. Id. at 397.
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holding . that the St. Paul ordinance is fatally overbroad because it
criminalizes not only unprotected expression but expression protected
by the First Amendment. 267  The concurrence took issue with the
majority's "underbreadth" reasoning that if some fighting words are to
268be regulated then all fighting words must also be regulated. Rather
than relying on this "underbreadth" rationale, the concurrence argued
that the statute was unconstitutional on "overbreadth" grounds: that is,
the St. Paul ordinance impermissibly proscribed speech that caused
"only hurt feelings, offense, or resentment."269 Racial epithets that
only cause hurt feelings, according to this rationale, may not be
regulated.27 °
Two important lessons emerge from the Court's decision in
R.A. V.271 First, both the majority and concurring opinions make it
very difficult for states and municipalities to pass hate speech
ordinances, and both hold that speech that causes resentment272 cannot
be regulated.273 Second, the R.A.V. majority reads the First
Amendment as prohibiting the State from making distinctions about
the content of various types of speech.274 For example, statutes cannot
make distinctions between a neo-Nazi burning a cross on a black
person's lawn and an environmentalist planting a tree on a lumber
company's property. Both of these actions are forms of "speech"
under First Amendment jurisprudence, although they are very different
types of expression with very different meanings. The cross burning is
intended to cause harm based on an immutable characteristic, such as
the color of one's skin, whereas the tree planting is intended to express
a political statement about the environment. Based on the majority's
holding, a court would not be able to distinguish between these two
forms of speech. This reflects the liberal position that the government
should remain neutral and allow the marketplace of ideas to police the
content of speech. 275
Because of the liberal emphasis on autonomy, abstract rights
and the marketplace of ideas, hate speech ordinances will always be
267. Id. (White, J., concurring).
268. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 414.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 382-96.
272. For example, non-violent statements of racial supremacy or inferiority.
273. R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 382-96.
274. Id.
275. See supra notes 246-52 and accompanying text.
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276
closely scrutinized, rarely surviving such scrutiny. To overcome
this strict scrutiny, states and municipalities must demonstrate a
compelling state interest and demonstrate that the means for
addressing this compelling interest are narrowly tailored to address
that interest only. 277  In other words, as both the majority and
concurrence agree, a hate speech ordinance cannot be "overbroad,"
and prohibit non-proscribable speech.278  Moreover, as the majority
holds, it cannot be "underbroad," in that the State cannot proscribe
only certain forms of speech to the exclusion of others. 279 Under a
liberal legal system, burning a cross is conceptualized as a form of
individual expression. 28  Also, since this expression is the very
embodiment of the individual's autonomy, the system endows this
expression with an inherent value and provides it with heightened
protections. 281 However, under a jurisprudence based on tolerance as
understanding, the presumptions disfavoring content-based regulation
would not weigh nearly as heavily, and conduct antithetical to norms
associated with understanding, such as cross burning, would not
receive such protection.
282
Of course, some liberals could argue that governmental
regulation of cross burning would lead down a slippery slope, allowing
the government to make decisions concerning a wide variety of
speech. Though this argument is not without merit, it is flawed in
many respects. First, it is important to recognize that the
government's affirmative refusal to make distinctions between varying
types of speech is not a neutral political policy, but rather a reflection
of liberal values.283 Having a laissez-faire approach to speech is an
276. See supra notes 250-73 and accompanying text.
277. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 395-96.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. Whether that expression, which has some First Amendment protections, may be
regulated depends, in part, on whether the expression is being regulated or whether the mode
or consequences of that expression is being regulated. See Tex. v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989) (burning the flag is expressive conduct, which may not be regulated merely for the
purposes of barring the expression itself). The Supreme Court will likely decide the issue of
to what extent cross-buming may be regulated in the next term. Va. v. Black, 553 S.E.2d 738
(Va. 2001), cert. granted, 535 U.S. 1094 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2002) (No. 01-1107). Since the time of
this writing, the Court rendered an opinion in Virginia v. Black on April 7, 2003. See Va. v.
Black, No. 01-1107, 2003 WL 1791218 (U.S. Apr. 7, 2003).
281. See supra notes 239-48 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 239-48 and accompanying text.
283. See SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE, supra note 119; MARCUSE,
Repressive Tolerance in A CRITIQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE, supra note 131; Tribe, The Puzzling
Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, supra note 131.
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affirmative government decision to support certain political and social
norms; 284 most frequently, these norms are status quo norms.
285
Second, even if the government may impermissibly regulate
certain forms of protected speech, it does not necessarily follow that an
absolute bar to governmental distinctions regarding speech is the better
course. For those in society who are discriminated against the most, it
might be the case that a government that mistakenly restricts some
beneficial speech, while zealously prosecuting hate speech, is better
than one which is less zealous in its prosecution, but rarely restricts
beneficial speech. By analogy, the government makes numerous
mistakes with respect to many types of criminal prosecutions, yet no
one would argue that there should be an absolute bar to all criminal
prosecutions.
Third, in a world as complex as ours, it seems fairly apparent
that social order requires that the government make distinctions.
Although presumably not everyone can agree that American slavery or
the Holocaust were real and tragic events, because of the need to
demonstrate compassion and empathy for those who suffered,
tolerance as understanding would strongly question those who deny it.
Tolerance as understanding would be most concerned with the
relationship between the denial of these truths and the denial of the
need for a compassionate and empathetic understanding of these
events. Because autonomy is not its guiding principle, tolerance as
understanding is not hampered by an overreaching fidelity to protect
one's right to speak and think as one chooses.
286
This discussion concerning tolerance as understanding and
hate speech leads to a number of tentative conclusions. First, if
autonomy and individual conscience were not paramount virtues of
society, then the First Amendment would no longer rely as heavily on
284. By analogy, having a laissez-faire approach to social issues or taxes is an affirmative
government decision.
285. See supra note 283.
286. The right to "conscience," as well as the consequent rights to certain expressive
forms of speech and actions, would not be permitted where they went outside the normative
parameters established by the norms of empathy and compassion. Essentially, this is a
challenge to the Lockean view of an unbridled right to conscience. See LOCKE, ESSAY
CONCERNING TOLERATION, supra note 2, at 190-91. Locke writes:
That in speculations and religious worship every man hath a perfect,
uncontrollable liberty which he may freely use, without, or contrary to the
magistrate's command, without any guilt or sin at all; provided always that
it be all done sincerely and out of conscience to God, according to the best
of his knowledge and persuasion.
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these principles when they come into direct conflict with the obligation
to practice understanding. Even if speech had some basis in truth and
was political in nature, both important values in a liberal regime, this
speech may not necessarily receive protection. For example, assuming
that an individual calmly says at a peaceful rally of like-minded
individuals, "there should be a law prohibiting any more Kikes from
becoming Senators, because there are a disproportionate number of
Kikes in the Senate now." This statement is a political expression, not
intended as fighting words. Moreover, this statement is based on a
partial truth, as over the last ten years, there has been a
disproportionate amount of Jewish senators.287 Under our present
liberal system, if this statement was said in a non-threatening manner,
it would be considered "high speech" and would be afforded the
highest level of protection.28 Conversely, under a system based on
tolerance as understanding, this sort of speech would be so contrary to
the core principles of understanding that it would not receive such
protection. Additionally, such speech would not be viewed merely as
an abstract right possessed by the individual. Rather, such speech
would be conceptualized as a social interaction with attendant mutual
obligations. The obligation would require individuals to use speech in
manners that are not purposefully hateful towards others. Obviously,
creating clear standards concerning the requisite degree of intent and
the level of harm would be a difficult task.289 But as suggested above,
this difficulty exists in many places in the law and is a necessary evil
in avoiding greater ills such a cross-burning, swastika-wearing, and
other forms of expression, which are intended to spread hate and result
in harm.29°
287. In 2000, ten percent of the Senate, about four times the population of Jews of
America, was Jewish. These Senators are Dianne Feinstein, Barbara Boxer, Herb Kohl,
Russell Feingold, Frank Lautenberg, Paul Wellstone, Arlen Specter, Chuck Schumer, Joseph
Lieberman, Carl Levin. Matt Cooper, Good for the Jews?, E-mail From the Trail (Aug. 4,
2000), available at http://www.time.com/time/campaign2OOO/email/email_0804c.html (last
visited Apr. 11, 2003) (on file with MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion,
Gender and Class).
288. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
289. Id.
290. In R.A.V., the St. Paul ordinance (which clearly prohibits at least two acts -- the
burning of a cross and display of a swastika) attempts to delineate both an intent standard and
a level of harm standard. The ordinance provides that whoever places a symbol which "one
knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the
basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor." Id. at 380 (citing St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, St. Paul Minn.,
Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990)). This standard is capable of being enforced and represents the
mutual obligations individuals have to avoid purposeful injury to others under a system based
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Finally, the real-world experiences of those who suffer as a
result of an expansive freedom of speech would be given great priority
under a jurisprudence based on tolerance as understanding. The
psychological and emotional pain suffered by those who are
discriminated against would be weighed against the marginal value of
permitting clearly racist speech.29' In most cases, these empathetic
narratives of pain, as well as the social inequalities that are perpetuated
through racist speech, would trump the right to think, speak and act as
one chooses.29 Additionally, a theory of jurisprudence based on
tolerance as understanding, perhaps not unlike that of many liberal
theories, must strongly consider the argument that racist speech has the
overall effect of reducing free speech.293  This argument must be
considered because it may silence those to whom this speech is
directed.294
Notwithstanding the foregoing arguments, it is important not to
overstate tolerance as understanding's position on free speech. Most
importantly, the bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment,
that the State should not interfere with an individual's expression,
295
would be maintained under a system based on tolerance as
understanding. There is nothing about a jurisprudence based on norms
of understanding that would suggest that the State should interfere
with individuals' views on politics, religion, art, sexual relations, and
the like.296
It is only when the freedom of expression clearly impinges on
the obligation for mutual understanding that speech should be
curtailed.297 Furthermore, if speech is curtailed, it should be curtailed
only to the extent necessary to deter future hatred. Put somewhat
on tolerance as understanding.
291. See, e.g., Mar Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Consider the Victim's
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2336 (1989) (arguing that victims of hate speech may
experience post-traumatic stress disorder, hypertension, fear, psychosis and nightmares).
292. As I suggested earlier, a theory of jurisprudence based on tolerance as
understanding strongly questions the Millian/Lockean notion that the right to think as one
chooses is a value in and of itself, irrespective of the content of that individual's conscience
and the consequences of that conscience. Cf Akhil Amar, The Case of the Missing
Amendments: R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV 124 (1992) (suggesting that the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment values of equality might limit First Amendment
values).
293. See supra notes 291-92 and accompanying text.
294. John Stuart Mill, who arrives at his defense of free speech through a utilitarian
analysis, never considers this argument in his utility calculus.
295. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
296. See supra notes 137-82 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 137-82 and accompanying text.
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differently, the slight value gained by allowing speech that is
predominantly hate-based is outweighed by the importance of
promoting the values of understanding.
C. Gay Rights
As opposed to hate speech and the death penalty, tolerance as
understanding and liberal tolerance share much in common with
respect to gay rights. The reason for this common position in gay
rights cases is that the core disagreement between the two paradigms
does not come into conflict. In other words, tolerance as
understanding's obligation to practice empathy and compassion does
not come in conflict with the liberal right to pursue one's own
conception of the good. As a general proposition, both jurisprudential
views should be highly supportive of gay rights.
298
Notwithstanding this general agreement, there are two potential
caveats to consider. First, there is at least one Supreme Court case,
Bowers v. Hardwick,299 which suggests that the majority's historical
and moral disapproval of homosexuality may be used to
counterbalance the individual's right to pursue his or her sexual
identity. But, as will be discussed below, this decision may be
characterized as a non-liberal decision.30 0  Second, and more
importantly, in some situations, well-established liberal rights may
come in conflict with one another. For example, the right to pursue
one's sexual identity may come into conflict with the similarly
important liberal right of the freedom of association. In Boy Scouts of
• 301
America v. Dale, the Supreme Court upheld the Boy Scouts' First
Amendment freedom of association right to revoke a Scout leader's
membership based on his advocacy of homosexuality, even though this
298. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that the Colorado
legislature could not pass a referendum, and a consequent constitutional amendment, to
prohibit Colorado municipalities from passing pro-gay rights legislation). The Romer decision
is compatible with both liberal jurisprudence and tolerance as understanding. Both paradigms
are generally skeptical of laws, which discriminate against specific groups based on moral
practices that do not prohibit the majority from practicing its own morality. See infra notes
317-331, discussing the Millian harm principle.
299. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
300. Moreover, there is the possibility that Bowers will be either overruled or
circumscribed in the near future. As of the writing of this article, the Supreme Court was
revisiting certain aspects of the Bowers decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 41 S.w.3d 349 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2001), cert. granted, 123 S.Ct. 661 (U.S. Dec. 2, 2002) (No. 02-102).
301. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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revocation violated a New Jersey anti-discrimination law.30 2 This
decision can be reconciled with liberal jurisprudence, but cannot be
reconciled with a jurisprudence based on tolerance as understanding.
In Bowers, the Supreme Court decided whether the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected a gay man's right to
engage in consensual sodomy. 30 3 The due process clause provides that
no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law. ' 3°4 Although this clause appears to be primarily
procedural in nature, the Supreme Court, beginning in the 1960's,
began holding that the due process clause also protects certain
substantive rights, such as the right to use contraception, 30 5 and the
right to have an abortion. 30 6
The Bowers Court was confronted with a Georgia criminal
statute, which provided, in relevant part, "a person commits the
offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act
involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of
another." 307 The 5-4 majority opinion distinguished Griswold30 8 and
Roe30 9 as cases involving fundamental rights concerning family,
marriage, and the decision to have children. 31 0 Homosexual sodomy,
according to the Court, bore no relation to these traditional rights.311
The Court distinguished between a homosexual man's right to engage
in consensual sex and a heterosexual man's right to have sex while
wearing a condom. 312
The Bowers Court gave little credence to the traditional liberal
argument of Michael Hardwick -- that the majority's disapproval of
homosexuality is an illegitimate reason for justifying anti-sodomy
statutes. 313 Instead, the majority opinion relied heavily on the claim
that homosexual conduct has been traditionally disfavored and deemed
302. See infra text of the anti-discrimination statute accompanying note 335.
303. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 189-96.
304. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
305. Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (due process clause protects the right to use
contraceptives).
306. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (due process clause protects the right to
abortion). Griswold and Roe are part of the "modem substantive due process" lineage, which
constitutionalizes the right to personal privacy.
307. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-62 (1984). This crime carried a minimum sentence of one
year and a maximum sentence of twenty. Id.
308. 381 U.S. 479.
309. 410 U.S. 113.
310. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189-96 (1986).
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
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immoral.314 Of particular importance to the majority was the fact that
proscriptions against homosexual sodomy have ancient roots, and that
in the year the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, all but five of the
then thirty-seven states, criminalized sodomy.
315
Justice Blackmun's dissent in Bowers took the contrary
position. He argued that the moral and historical disapproval of
homosexuality, without more, cannot be a basis for criminalizing
homosexual conduct. 316 From a liberal perspective, the dissent is the
more persuasive opinion. The dissent accused the majority of missing
the main point of the case: that substantive due process is not designed
to protect homosexuality per se, but the "right most valued by
civilized men, namely, the right to be let alone."
317
The dissent dismissed the Court's historically ingrained moral
argument that homosexuality is wrong, relying instead on the
empirical claim that homosexuality is an indispensable component of
an individual's identity and autonomy. 318 This empirical claim about
identity fits neatly within the modem liberal moral framework, as it
holds that "a certain private sphere of individual liberty will be kept
largely beyond the government." 3 1 9 The dissent persuasively argued
that Bowers was a natural and constitutionally permissible extension of
32 321Griswold320 and Roe. Contrary to the majority's assertion,
Griswold322 and Roe323 were not decisions designed to promote a
particular moral or religious view, but rather, decisions designed to
promote the individual's ability to make autonomous decisions
concerning intimate private matters.324 In short, the dissent concluded
314. Id.
315. Id. at 191-96.
316. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199-214.
317. Id. at 199 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)). This liberal ideal is the cornerstone of the dissent in Bowers. In the tradition of
Millian liberalism, the dissent challenged the Court's rejection of Hardwick's moral argument
and argued that for the majority to drastically penalize a minority on an issue as intimate and
private as sodomy, it must have a legitimate basis well beyond old-fashioned moral
repugnancy. The social side-effects of sodomy are so limited, according to this liberal
argument, that the majority must have a compelling reason for regulating this almost
exclusively private behavior.
318. Id. at 204-14.
319. Id. at 199 (citing Thornburg v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 772 (1986)).
320. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
321. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
322. 381 U.S. 479.
323. 410 U.S. 113.
324. Justice Blackmun wrote:
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that because Hardwick's conduct did not interfere with the rights of
others, and because there was no justification beyond a history of
religious and moral intolerance of homosexuals to prohibit Hardwick's
private sexual conduct, Georgia's statute should be struck down.325
The dissent, which reflects a truer liberal position, has much in
common with a jurisprudence based on tolerance as understanding.
Homosexual and heterosexual relationships are equally capable of
producing an intimacy based on compassion and mutual
understanding. Thus, it would be paradoxical to treat the "right to
love" differently based on whether it is homosexual or heterosexual in
nature. In line with this reasoning, liberal scholar David Richards
writes:
Intimate relationships -- which give play to love,
devotion, friendship as organizing themes in self-
conceptions of permanent value in living -- are among
the essential resources of moral independence.
Protection from hostile interest thus nurtures these
intimate personal resources, a wholeness of emotion,
intellect, and self-image guided by the self-determining
moral powers of a free person. 326
We protect the decision whether to have a child because parenthood alters
so dramatically an individual's self-definition, not because of
demographic considerations or the Bible's command to be fruitful.... we
protect the family because it contributes so powerfully to the happiness of
individuals, not because of a preference for stereotypical households.
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 205.
325. Interestingly, if at least one Justice in the majority was more empathetic to the
concerns of homosexuals, the decision may have relied on a broader perspective and its
reasoning may have been more informed. As a matter of historical record, one Justice in the
majority, Justice Powell, admitted that it was his lack of empathy for homosexuals that caused
him to uphold the statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy. JOHN C. JEFFERIES, JR., JUSTICE
LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. (1994). Powell claimed during the consideration of Bowers that he did
not know, much less have a close personal relationship with, anyone who was a homosexual.
Ironically, his law clerk was gay. Years after Bowers, in part as a result of the revelation that
he had known gay men, and in the case of at least one, worked closely with him, Powell
admitted that his vote in Bowers was misguided. This is important because what changed his
opinion was neither some new reflection on politics nor a change in the Constitution. Rather,
it was a heightened understanding, a newfound empathy, for a group of individuals he first
came to know. As John Jeffries, a former law clerk and biographer of Justice Powell, noted
"Powell had never known a homosexual because he did not want to. In his world of
accomplishment and merit, homosexuality did not fit, and Powell therefore did not see it." Id.
at 529.
326. RICHARDS, TOLERATION, supra note 5, at 244.
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As this passage suggests, in the context of loving relationships,
autonomy and understanding, far from being mutually exclusive, are
inextricably intertwined. From a Millian liberal perspective, the right
to a homosexual lifestyle is a right that primarily affects the individual
alone. 327 Although protections for gay rights may have some social
side effects, like challenging certain traditional and religious
conceptions of the family, the costs of these social side effects are
outweighed by the paramount virtue of autonomy. 328 In other words,
even though the majority may disapprove of such conduct, this
disapproval does not outweigh the value derived from protecting
individuals in their pursuit of the good. From the Kantian or Rawlsian
liberal perspective, of which David Richards' quote above is a part,
individuals should have the right to autonomously pursue relationships
of their choosing, as this right is essential for individual self-
definition. 329 One may take this Kantian proposition one step further
in suggesting that this unfettered pursuit of meaningful relationships
fosters the values underlying tolerance as understanding.
In the Bowers dissent, the positions of liberalism and tolerance
as understanding are congruous. 33  According to the Millian harm
principle, 331 a majority's disapproval of gay rights must be a secondary
concern to the individual's right to pursue his or her own conception of
the good.332 But, where the liberal right to pursue one's own
conception of the good comes in conflict with the liberal freedom of
association, liberalism's position is far less clear. 3
33
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale334 illustrates this conflict. In
Boy Scouts, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that New
Jersey's public accommodations law cannot be applied so as to
prohibit the Boy Scouts from revoking a Scoutmaster's membership
327. See supra notes 5, 22, 69, 76, 87-96 and accompanying text.
328. For Millian liberalism, autonomy is the paramount means for social progress. See
supra notes 5, 22, 69, 76, 87-96 and accompanying text. To the extent there are social side
effects of autonomy, like impinging on another's morality, they can only be regulated if they
preclude the right of the other to act autonomously. The right to be gay may impinge on
others' morality, but it does not preclude the others from acting autonomously and choosing
traditional lives for themselves.
329. RICHARDS, TOLERATION, supra note 5, at 244.
330. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
331. This principle states that an individual may do as he chooses so long as he causes no
direct harm to others. See supra notes 5, 22, 69, 76, 87-96 and accompanying text.
332. See supra note 328.
333. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
334. Id.
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based on his advocacy of homosexuality. 335 According to the Court,
because the Boy Scouts inculcate values contrary to homosexuality,
the Boy Scouts had a First Amendment right to exclude the
Scoutmaster from their organization.336 The Court advanced the
liberal First Amendment position that the government should not
interfere with an individual's right to associate with whomever they
choose and should not interfere with the right of a group of similar-
thinking individuals to collectively espouse their views.
337
The dissent in Boy Scouts also advanced a liberal argument, but
one tempered by concerns about equality. 338 The dissent argued that
the freedom of association is not a license to violate state anti-
discrimination laws. 339  Because the freedom of association only
attaches to unequivocal and uniform advocacy of positions, any
organization invoking such a freedom must demonstrate that the
person whom the organization seeks to exclude epitomizes the
contrary position. 340  The dissent placed a higher burden on the
organization to demonstrate that the interloper would have hampered
organizational imperatives. 341 Nevertheless, like the majority opinion,
the dissent upheld the right of a group to exclude members, regardless
335. The New Jersey public accommodations law provides:
All persons shall have the opportunity to obtain employment,
and to obtain all the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges
of any place of public accommodation, publicly assisted housing
accommodation, and other real property without discrimination because of
race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, familial status, or sex, subject
only to conditions and limitation applicable alike to all persons. This
opportunity is recognized as and declared to be a civil right.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5 (1) (West Supp. 2003). In the definition section of the statute, the
term "public accommodation" is broadly defined and the New Jersey Supreme Court
interpreted it so as to include accommodations utilized by the Boy Scouts.
336. Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 647-48 (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 622-23 (1984)) ("Forcing a group to accept certain members may impair the ability of the
group to express those views, and only those views, that it intends to express. Thus,
'[f]reedom of association.., plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.').
337. The Court stated:
We are not, as we must not be, guided by our views of whether the Boys
Scouts' teachings with respect to homosexual conduct are right or wrong;
public or judicial disapproval of a tenet of an organization's expression
does not justify the State's effort to compel the organization to accept
members where such acceptance would derogate from the organization's
expressive message.
Id. at 661.
338. Id. at 678-80 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
339. Id. at 648-60.
340. Id. at 678-80.
341. Id.
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of whether the exclusion is based on prejudice or unfounded hatred.342
Thus, although the dissent was more sympathetic to the Scoutmaster's
claims, it still took the liberal position that those who unequivocally
advocate a position may be shielded from anti-discrimination laws. 343
Under a theory of jurisprudence based on tolerance as
understanding, this right of a group to exclude would be limited. The
reasons for exclusion could not include reasons contrary to tolerance
as understanding such as racism, homophobia, anti-Semitism, or
misogyny. 344 As was suggested earlier, under a theory of tolerance
based on understanding, the individual's right to noninterference is not
necessarily as great as another individual's right to commune or
associate with others.
345
D. Rights of Religious Minorities
The degree to which a State should tolerate minority religious
practices that run contrary to the State's interests is a troubling issue
for both liberalism and theories based on tolerance as understanding.
Generally, in cases raising this issue, the State argues that the
minority's religious practice, and/or its refusal to abide by generally
applicable laws, will greatly harm the secular purposes of the State.346
For example, if a religion requires an individual to engage in a
criminal activity, like taking illegal drugs, then the liberal legal system
would have to balance two very powerful competing claims: the
individual's right to autonomously pursue her own conception of the
good and the State's right to enforce its laws in a neutral fashion. 34 7
As will be discussed below, for both liberalism and tolerance as
understanding, it is difficult to discern a clear method for deciding
whether the individual's religious convictions should take precedence
over the need for social order and uniform laws.
Recent jurisprudential history demonstrates liberalism's
uncertainty with respect to the rights of religious minorities. In just
seven short years, from 1990-1997, the legal standards with respect to
accommodating religious minorities vacillated back and forth
numerous times. Beginning in the 1960's, the Supreme Court began to
342. Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 678-99.
343. Id.
344. See supra note 67.
345. See supra notes 96-97.
346. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
347. Id.
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interpret the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment in a manner
that often favored the rights of religious minorities.348 In Sherbert v.
Verner, for example, the Supreme Court held that a State could not
deny unemployment insurance to a Seventh Day Adventist who was
fired from her job because she was a Saturday Sabbath observer.349
The compelling state interest test established in Verner was the law
until 1990, when it was rejected in Employment Division v Smith.35 °
In Smith, the Court decided whether the Free Exercise Clause
permitted Oregon to deny unemployment benefits to individuals who
were fired from their jobs for using illegal drugs in religiously required
ceremonies. 35 1 Writing for the Smith majority, Justice Scalia refused
to apply the compelling state interest test and held that the First
Amendment does not protect religious minorities from abiding by
"neutral generally applicable laws," such as criminal laws.352
In 1993, in response to Smith's discarding of the pro-religious
rights "compelling state interest test," Congress passed the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),353 which reinstated the compelling
state interest test and overturned Smith.354 However, Congress'
reinstatement of the compelling state interest test was short-lived. In
1997, in City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court declared RFRA
unconstitutional.355 Relying on the landmark holding of Marbury v.
Madison, which held that it is within the province of the judicial
348. See Sherbert v. Verner, 494 U.S. 872 (1963); Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
349. The State, according to the Court, could not withhold the insurance based on the fact
that the Seventh Day Adventist refused to take jobs that required her to work on her Sabbath.
Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398. For the State to impose such a substantial burden on a religious
minority, the State had to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest and had to
demonstrate that the means for achieving this interest were narrowly tailored. In other words,
if the State could achieve this compelling state interest by a method that was less burdensome
on the religious interest, then the State was constitutionally required to do so. Id.
350. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
351. In Smith, the terminated employee was a member of the Native American Church,
which had a religious ritual involving the consumption of peyote, an illegal hallucinogenic.
Id. The employee was fired for taking peyote and denied unemployment benefits because he
was discharged for misconduct. Id.
352. Id.
353. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb etseq. (2003).
354. RFRA stated in relevant part:
Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, [unless] it
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1) is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
RFRA §§ 2000bb-1.
355. City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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branch to determine what the Constitution says, the Flores Court said
Congress lacked the authority to overturn Smith's constitutional
holding concerning the meaning of the First Amendment's Free
Exercise Clause.
356
This seesawing between the "compelling state interest test" and
the "neutral laws of general applicability test" reflects the ambivalence
of liberalism towards State accommodation of religious practices that
interfere with neutral State laws. This ambivalence mirrors the
difficulty in determining the outer-limits of autonomy under Mill's
harm principle. According to Millian liberal theory, the individual has
a strong right to autonomy so long as he does not cause harm to
others.3 7 In religious accommodation cases, the two central issues are
how much social harm results from making exceptions to laws of
general applicability, and should the State or the majority have to incur
the costs associated with the social harm?358  Liberalism fails to
provide clear guidelines for evaluating these competing claims because
of the normative and empirical ambiguities associated with
determining whether the right to autonomy has infringed upon the
Millian obligation not to cause harm to others. 359 For similar reasons,
as will be discussed below, a theory of jurisprudence based on
tolerance as understanding has little more ability to provide clear
guidelines. These difficulties will be elaborated upon in the context of
the Supreme Court case, Wisconsin v. Yoder.360  Yoder, along with
Sherbert v. Verner,36 1 helped to establish the compelling state interest
test.
362
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court held that
Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law, which required
children to attend school until age sixteen, violated Amish parents'
constitutional right to freely exercise their religion.363  The Amish
parents in Yoder were fined for refusing to send their fourteen and
fifteen-year-old children to school beyond the eighth grade, even
though the parents maintained that attendance of school past this age
356. Id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
357. MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 2, at 12 ("That the only purpose for which power can
be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others."). "
358. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
359. See supra notes 5, 22, 69.
360. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
361. 494 U.S. 872 (1963).
362. Id.; 406 U.S. 205.
363. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234.
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conflicted with the religious and communal tenets of the Old Order
Amish communities. 364  In deciding Yoder, the Supreme Court
balanced the State's paramount responsibility for educating its citizens
with the right to exercise one's religious convictions. 365 The State of
Wisconsin put forth two reasons in defense of its compulsory school
attendance law.366  First, it argued that an educated citizenry is
essential for a participatory political system to operate effectively.
367
Second, it argued that an education allows for individuals to be self-
368reliant. The Court rejected the State's claims by arguing that an
eighth grade education, in addition to the real world education of the
Amish beyond the eighth grade, allowed the Amish to be self-reliant
369
citizens capable of participating in the political system. The Court
concluded that Wisconsin's interests in requiring education until the
age of sixteen was neither a compelling government interest nor
sufficiently tailored to achieve this interest.
37 °
In concurrence, Justices White, Brennan and Stewart
questioned the Court's favorable treatment of the Amish's free
exercise claim.371  Justice White wrote, "This would be a very
different case for me if [the Amish's] claim[s] were that their religion
forbade their children from attending any school at any time and from
complying in any way with the educational standards set by the
364. As the Court noted :
Formal high school education beyond the eighth grade is contrary to
Amish beliefs, not only because it places Amish children in an
environment hostile to Amish beliefs with increasing emphasis on
competition in class work and sports and with pressure to conform to the
styles, manners, and the ways of the peer group, but also because it takes
them away from their community, physically and emotionally, during the
crucial and formative adolescent period of life. During this period, the
children must acquire Amish attitudes favoring manual work and self-
reliance and the specific skills needed to perform the adult role of an
Amish farmer or housewife.
Id. at 211.
365. Id. at 221. The Court stated:
By preserving doctrinal flexibility and recognizing the need for a sensible
and realistic application of the Religion Clauses 'we have been able to
chart a course that preserved the autonomy and freedom of religious
bodies while avoiding any semblance of established religion. This is a
tight rope and one we have successfully traversed.'
Id.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 222-36.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 238 (White, J., concurring).
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State., 372  Justice White strongly emphasized the importance of
compulsory education laws for a democratic society as well as uniform
educational standards. 373 Justice White further argued that even if the
parents object, the State has an obligation to the child to provide the
tools for them to live, including the tools necessary to live outside the
community, in the event the child chose to do so.
3 74
Justice Douglas took this State obligation argument one step
further in his partial dissent from the opinion. 375  Justice Douglas
argued that the decision whether to attend school cannot rest in the
parents' hands alone, as the child will be the one who has to deal with
376the consequences of that decision for his or her entire life. Justice
Douglas worried that by denying an Amish child an education beyond
the eighth grade, that child might be denied the opportunity of
becoming whoever that child wants to be.37 7 Justice Douglas argued
that the State had a legitimate role in protecting the child's interests in
being educated beyond the eighth grade.378 Both the concurrence and
partial dissent were particularly concerned with the claim that the State
has the obligation to protect the children.379 Although this claim may
be viewed as a liberal one, meaning the State must ensure that the
child has the right to pursue his own good, the conception of the State
as parens patriae has been traditionally considered non-liberal and
highly paternalistic.38 °
372. Id.
373. Id. at 238-41.
374. Id.
375. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 241-49 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
376. Id.
377. Id. at 243-47.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. As the majority opinion argues, "if the State is empowered, as parens patriae, to
'save' a child from himself or his Amish parents by requiring an additional two years of
compulsory formal high school education, the State will in large measure influence, if not
determine, the religious future of the child." Id. at 232. Surprisingly, Justice Douglas, one of
the Court's greatest liberals, seemed to have taken a non-liberal position. As James Gordon
writes:
Yoder also involved an apparent role-reversal. Chief Justice Burger, the
opinion's author, was in Yoder the great champion of First Amendment
rights. Ironically, the sole dissenter was Justice Douglas. Burger wrote, in
language that easily could have been penned by Douglas, "There can be
no assumption that today's majority is 'right' and the Amish and others
like them are 'wrong.' A way of life that is odd or even erratic but
interferes with no rights or interests of others is not to be condemned
because it is different." Douglas, rising to the challenge, assumed that the
Amish were indeed "wrong" and condemned them harshly: "If [a child] is
2003]
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This ambivalence and lack of clear guidelines in liberalism is
also present in theories of jurisprudence based on tolerance as
understanding. A legal theory based on norms of understanding
would similarly have to balance the religious convictions of minorities
versus the State's interest in having an educated citizenry. Such a
theory would also have to consider the ability of children to survive
outside of the Amish community. In balancing these various interests,
it is important to consider the empirical evidence on how the lives of
children within insulated communities are impacted by their
insulation. As a general proposition, it seems that a theory based on
norms of understanding, which necessarily would emphasize the virtue
of mutual empathy and universal concern for all, might be somewhat
skeptical of religious claims necessitating insulation from others.
38
'
As has been suggested above in the Boy Scouts case, 382 the
right of autonomy -- whether in the form of freedom of association, as
in the Boy Scouts case, or freedom of religion, as in the Yoder case --
does not extend to cases clearly antithetical to the practices of
understanding.383  Thus, liberal freedoms could not be used to
legitimize or excuse racist, homophobic or anti-Semitic speech or
actions. Unlike liberal theories, which require the government to
remain neutral with respect to different religions and apply general
principles toward all religious claims, tolerance as understanding
would not protect the individual's right to believe as he chooses where
this right trespasses on the norms associated with understanding.
Rather than remaining neutral with respect to the validity of an
individual's conscience or a group's religious practices, tolerance as
understanding would examine whether communities are practicing
values not directly antithetical to norms of understanding. With
respect to Yoder,384 the central issue would be whether exempting
children from minimal educational requirements, such as years of
harnessed to the Amish way of life by those in authority over him and if
his education is truncated, his entire life may be stunted and deformed."
James Gordon, Wisconsin v. Yoder and Religious Liberty, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1237, 1238-39
(internal citation omitted).
381. One might argue that where. religious claims demanding insularity come in direct
conflict with the more universal aspirations requiring empathy and compassion for all, that
these religious claims be closely scrutinized. On the other hand, so long as no direct harm is
being done by these insulated minorities -- that is they are not promoting values directly
antithetical to norms of understanding -- it would seem that there would be an obligation to
tolerate the insulation.
382. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
383. See supra notes 60-67, 137-82 and accompanying text.
384. Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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schooling or uniform requirements, would impermissibly interfere
with the children's ability to engage in the mutual obligations
associated with understanding. 385 Put differently, would the refusal of
the Amish parents' to send their children to school greatly diminish the
children's ability to practice empathy and compassion either within or
outside the Amish community?
386
In short, one of the most important distinctions discussed
throughout these four issues is the willingness of theories based on
norms of understanding to question legal norms, which protect the
individual's right to conscience and autonomy. 387  Central to this
discussion of hate speech, gay rights, and minority religious freedoms
is that tolerance as understanding subjected First Amendment
protections of political and religious expression to scrutiny where they
impinged upon the mutual obligation not to hate.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is important to stress a central overarching
theme that has been suggested throughout, namely, a theory of
jurisprudence based on norms of understanding would be more likely
to de-emphasize the role of interests in constitutional disputes than a
liberal-based theory. A theory based on understanding would re-
conceptualize the standard liberal legal conceptions of constitutional
dispute resolution. Liberal dispute resolution generally consists of
three components: (1) a formalistic and purportedly neutral process;
(2) an identification and crystallization of competing interests; and (3)
a resolution of these interests based on a balancing between norms of
autonomy and collective interest. 388  Liberal disputes are generally
385. Id.
386. Although no clear standards would flow from tolerance as understanding or
liberalism to assist in answering this question, there is an important distinction between the
two which has been addressed throughout the discussion of minority rights, as well as the
discussion of the death penalty, hate speech and gay rights. It would be far more in keeping
with a jurisprudence based on tolerance as understanding than one based on liberalism to
analyze each case on a pragmatic case-by-case basis. Whereas liberal norms of abstract rights,
formalism, and most importantly neutrality, would caution against such a case-specific
approach, tolerance as understanding would evaluate the fit between its norms of empathy,
compassion and humility and the specific narratives and evidence of the religious practice in
question.
387. See supra notes 60-67, 137-82 and accompanying text.
388. See generally ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 244; Tribe, The Puzzling
Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, supra note 131. See also ALEXANDER
M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra note 2.
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framed in adversarial terms.389 As a result of the system's desire to
concretize interests and highlight adversarial positions, mutually
shared interests are often devalued.
This dispute system of identifying and highlighting interests in
a neutral process is an outgrowth of the liberal norms of autonomy.
For normative reasons, like the importance of autonomy and
conscience, and empirical reasons, such as the "fact" of individuality,
constitutional disputes under a liberal legal system are generally
decided by balancing discrete interests in a purportedly neutral
process. 39  Political process theory, which reflects these liberal norms,
holds that disputes over distinct interests in society should be resolved
in a neutral political process based on liberal norms, such as free
speech and due process. 391 This interest-based theory is an integral
component of liberal adjudication. 392
Political process theory gained particular prominence in the
sixties, and is still one of the dominant paradigms in constitutional
dispute resolution. 393 The Supreme Court's most famous endorsement
of political process theory comes from Justice Stone's "footnote 4" in
United States v. Carolene Products.394  There, the Justice set forth
what is now a bedrock principle of constitutional jurisprudence: that
the judiciary's function is to "neutrally" police the political process to
ensure that various interests are given a fair opportunity to participate
in that process.3
95
But a theory based on understanding would conceive of social
disagreements in a different way. The most important objective of
such a legal system would not be the "neutral" definition and
389. The adversaries present self-interested arguments about the merits of their position.
Cf ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 244.
390. See generally sources cited supra note 388.
391. There is a vast literature concerning process-based theory, beginning with
Madison's Federalist # 10. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison). See ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST, supra note 244. See also political science literature on process politics, DAVID
TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951).
392. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison). See also ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST, supra note 244; DAVID TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951);
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); MILL, ON LIBERTY, supra
note 2.
393. See sources cited supra note 392.
394. 304 U.S. 104 (1938) (Stone, J., concurring).
395. A good example of the Court applying this theory is Harper v. Va. State Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). There, the Court struck down the poll tax, but did not address
any of the real substantive inequalities relating to race and elections. The Court emphasized
the importance of keeping the process of politics, as opposed to the substantive outcomes, fair.
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development of discrete interests, followed by resolution; rather the
system would attempt to ameliorate social cleavages and focus on
mutuality, connectedness and transcendence. In other words, a
heightened demonstration of understanding between the parties,
mutual empathy, compassion, sacrifice, forgiveness, and humility,
would trump the values of championing individual interests. 396  The
following stylized utilitarian calculus reflects this difference:
U(resolution) = p(B) - p(C) <
U(transcendence/communion) = p(B) - p(C)397
This equation reflects the notion that within controversial
moral disputes there is a great deal of uncertainty in ascertaining
empirical facts and choosing norms for weighing these uncertain facts.
In contrast, there is far greater certainty with respect to the values that
may be derived from the transcendence of the dispute and the
communion between the disputants.398 This simple utilitarian calculus
can provide fertile ground for advancing theories of tolerance based on
understanding. 399 This equation, and the ideas underlying it, deserve
far more attention than can be given to it in this conclusion. But it is
important to recognize that there are theoretically viable arguments,
such as those advanced in this article, for challenging liberalism's
396. See supra notes 47-130 and accompanying text.
397. In this standard utility equation, U stands for utility, p stands for probability, B
stands for benefits and C stands for costs. Thus, the utility derived from "resolving" a case
based on "individual interests" is outweighed by the utility of transcendence and communion.
398. The suggestion here is that when an issue is controversial, like certain aspects of
abortion, there is great difficulty in reaching a consensus about how to weigh competing moral
claims and the empirical evidence supporting those claims. But whereas the uncertainty
surrounding the controversial moral claims is usually high, the uncertainty about the benefits
of fostering communion (for example, empathy and compassion) is usually low. This is based
on the idea that mutual empathy and compassion should be the paramount moral goals of
human interaction, which includes human disputes. See supra notes 60-67, 137-82.
399. Although it is difficult to locate an example of a political institution employing the
utility calculus set forth above, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 510 U.S.
1309 (1994), the Supreme Court did approach the issue of abortion with an analogous form of
reasoning. In that case, three moderate conservatives on the Court upheld Roe v. Wade based
on concerns of social harmony, rather than the substantive issue in the case, whether the
Constitution protects a woman's right to choose. Even though these moderate conservatives
probably did not support the substantive outcome of Roe, they upheld it based on the
expectations women had developed during these twenty years of a Roe regime and the
political turmoil that might result if Roe were upset. These three conservative Reagan/Bush-
appointed Justices, however, did not argue, and likely did not believe, that Roe's substantive
holding that the Constitution protected a woman's right to choose was constitutionally tenable.
Rather, they placed values such as social harmony above substantive resolution. Id.
MARGINS
focus on resolving competing individual interests, rather than
attempting to harmonize interests by devaluing individuality.
In sum, this article has raised a number of questions about
liberalism and its relationship to tolerance. Tolerance has become
needlessly intertwined with liberalism, so much so that it is very rare
for scholars to think about tolerance in anything but liberal terms. But,
liberal tolerance is only one brand of tolerance. There are non-liberal
brands of tolerance, such as tolerance as understanding.40 0 Instead of
treating tolerance as a means to foster autonomy and individual
character as liberal theories do, tolerance as understanding treats
tolerance as an end in itself.40' Tolerance, according to this
perspective, is reconceived as a paramount moral obligation requiring
individuals to practice empathy, compassion and humility.
Tolerance as understanding and other non-liberal conceptions
of tolerance have a great deal to offer liberalism. Even if one
disagrees with the basic tenets underlying tolerance as understanding,
or believes that it cannot be a pragmatic guidepost for moral behavior,
it still offers a theoretical vehicle for critically analyzing the
shortcomings of liberal tolerance. As has been suggested throughout,
liberal tolerance, and the liberal legal and political institutions
supporting it, would benefit from engaging in a theoretical dialogue
with conceptions of tolerance not exclusively based on autonomy and
individuality.
400. See supra notes 60-67, 137-82 and accompanying text.
401. See supra pp. 35-37.
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